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Abstract
We characterize the communication complexity of truthful mechanisms. Our departure point
is the well known taxation principle. The taxation principle asserts that every truthful mecha-
nism can be interpreted as follows: every player is presented with a menu that consists of a price
for each bundle (the prices depend only on the valuations of the other players). Each player
is allocated a bundle that maximizes his profit according to this menu. We define the taxation
complexity of a truthful mechanism to be the logarithm of the maximum number of menus that
may be presented to a player.
Our main finding is that in general the taxation complexity essentially equals the com-
munication complexity. The proof consists of two main steps. First, we prove that for rich
enough domains the taxation complexity is at most the communication complexity. We then
show that the taxation complexity is much smaller than the communication complexity only in
“pathological” cases and provide a formal description of these extreme cases.
Next, we study mechanisms that access the valuations via value queries only. In this setting
we establish that the menu complexity – a notion that was already studied in several different
contexts – characterizes the number of value queries that the mechanism makes in exactly the
same way that the taxation complexity characterizes the communication complexity.
Our approach yields several applications, including strengthening the solution concept with
low communication overhead, fast computation of prices, and hardness of approximation by
computationally efficient truthful mechanisms.
∗Weizmann Institute of Science.
1 Introduction
The field of Communication Complexity studies settings in which n players are interested in com-
puting some known function f . Each player i, holds some input xi. The basic task is to determine
the maximum number of bits that the parties need to exchange in order to compute f(x1, . . . , xn).
One of the most successful applications of communication complexity is Algorithmic Mechanism
Design, starting with the pioneering work of Nisan and Segal [33, 35]. Nisan and Segal proved lower
bounds on the approximation ratios achievable by algorithms with low communication complexity
for combinatorial auctions. Many other applications of communication complexity to mechanism
design have been introduced since. For example, communication complexity is used to bound the
power of certain computationally-efficient truthful mechanisms [12, 7], to understand the overhead
of price computation [19, 2], and to prove bounds on the quality of equilibria [37].
Our goal in this paper is to answer a fundamental question in the intersection of communication
complexity and algorithmic mechanism design: given a truthful mechanism A, how many bits do
the parties need to exchange in order to determine the allocation and payments?
A bit more formally, the communication complexity of a protocol is the maximum number
of bits that are exchanged in the protocol, where the maximum is taken over all inputs. The
communication complexity of a function f , denoted cc(f), is the communication complexity of the
protocol that computes f with the smallest communication complexity.
A truthful mechanism A is composed of a social choice function that selects one alternative
from a set S of alternatives and a payment function that specifies the payment of each player. Our
results build on a basic concept of Mechanism Design, the taxation principle. Denote by vi(S) the
value of player i for alternative S ∈ S. The taxation principle asserts that A can be interpreted
in the following simple form: every player i is (implicitly) presented with a menu Mv−i that is a
function that assigns a price (possibly ∞) for each alternative in S. Mv−i depends only on the
valuations v−i of the other players. The truthful mechanism A always outputs an alternative S
that simultaneously maximizes the profit vi(S)−Mv−i(S) of each player i.
With this interpretation in mind, given a truthful mechanism A, for each player i denote by
M i = {Mv−i}v−i the set of menus that might be presented to i. Denote by tax(A) the taxation
complexity of a truthful mechanism A – the number of bits needed to represent an index of a specific
menu among the set of menus that may be presented to a player. That is, tax(A) = maxi log |M i|.
Our main finding directly connects the semantics of the mechanism and its communication
complexity by showing that the taxation complexity of every truthful mechanism essentially equals
its communication complexity:
Informal take-home message of this paper: In “rich enough” domains, tax(A) ≈ cc(A).
We also apply the lens of the taxation principle in a more restricted model and prove an analogous
result: if access to the valuations is restricted to value queries, then the menu complexity essentially
equals the query complexity (see definitions below).
In the rest of the introduction we provide a more formal description of the setup1, of the results,
and of various implications.
The Setting
For concreteness, this paper considers only the setting of combinatorial auctions, although it should
be possible to extend the results beyond that domain. In a combinatorial auction there is a set M
(|M | = m) of heterogeneous items and a set N (|N | = n) of players. The output is an allocation
1See Section A for formal definitions.
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(S1, . . . , Sn) of the items to the players. The private information of each player i is his value for
the set of items he receives: vi : 2
M → R. As common in the literature, in this paper we assume
that each vi is normalized (vi(∅) = 0) and monotone (for each S ⊆ T , vi(T ) ≥ vi(S)).
This paper considers truthful mechanisms. The Algorithmic Mechanism Design literature usu-
ally defines truthful mechanisms to be those that implement some social choice function in a
dominant-strategy equilibrium. In this paper a mechanism is truthful if it implements the social
choice function in an ex-post Nash equilibrium. This solution concept applies to games with in-
complete information and is closely related but less restrictive than dominant-strategy equilibrium
(this makes our results only stronger). It is more appropriate for the iterative mechanisms that this
paper considers. Very roughly speaking, in an ex-post Nash equilibrium a dominant strategy of
every player is to play according to his true valuation, as long as the other players are not playing
“crazy” strategies. We refer the reader to Section A for formal definitions and discussion.
The Taxation Principle in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
The taxation principle [22, 21] was already considered in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. Most
notably, the crux of the impossibility results of [9, 18, 16] is showing that for every mechanism that
approximately maximizes the welfare there must be an instance in which one player is presented a
“complicated” menu. In particular, finding a profit-maximizing bundle in that menu is hard.
The paper [23] considers a setting with only a single player whose valuation is drawn from
some known distribution. Since there is only one player, the taxation principle implies that all a
truthful mechanism can do is to present a fixed menu to the player. The player then “selects” a
profit-maximizing bundle. They show that to approximately maximize revenue the prices of many
alternatives (equivalently, bundles) in that menu must be finite (high “menu complexity”).
We stress that the notion of taxation complexity does not measure the difficulty of finding
a profit-maximizing bundle, nor how difficult it is to represent a specific menu. The taxation
complexity takes a more “high-level” view of the mechanism and only measures the number of
menus that might be presented to a player.
The Taxation Complexity is at most the Communication Complexity
Our first main result says that in rich enough domains the taxation complexity is at most the
communication complexity:
tax(A) ≤ cc(A)
We will shortly provide a more formal statement, but to better understand this result and its
implications, we first discuss a domain for which this result does not hold. Consider a two-player
combinatorial auction where the valuations of the players belong to the class of gross substitutes
(GS) valuations2. Let us furthermore restrict the values of all bundles to be integers in {1, . . . ,m}.
We study the VCG mechanism in that setting. Since the welfare maximizing allocation can be
found with poly(m) communication [35] (this is also implied by the algorithms mentioned in [31]),
the communication complexity of the VCG mechanism is poly(m) as well.
Let us now analyze the taxation complexity of the mechanism. Denote the valuation of player 1
by v. Player 1 presents a menu to player 2. By the definition of the VCG mechanism, the price of
bundle S in that menu is v(M) − v(M − S). Thus, there is a one-to-one and onto correspondence
between the set of possible valuations of player 1 and the set of menus he presents to player 2. All
2The definition of this class is subtle; Since it will not be needed in this paper, we refer the interested reader to
the survey [31] for a definition.
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that is left is to point out that the number of gross substitutes valuations is3 doubly exponential (e.g,
Knuth [25] shows that it is at least 2
( mm/2)
2m /m!). Therefore, for two players with gross substitutes
valuations, the taxation complexity of the VCG mechanism tax(V CG) is therefore exponential,
whereas the communication complexity cc(V CG) is polynomial.
In contrast, in richer domains the taxation complexity is not much larger than the communica-
tion complexity:
Theorem: Fix some mechanism A.
1. If A is truthful for general valuations, then tax(A) ≤ cc(A).
2. If A is truthful for subadditive valuations, then also tax(A) ≤ cc(A).
3. If A is truthful for XOS valuations, then tax(A) ≤ m · (cc(A) + 1).
4. If A is truthful for submodular valuations, then tax(A) ≤ d · m · (cc(A) + 1), where d =
|{M(S)}M,S | is the total number of distinct prices that appear in some menu.
The cautious reader might wonder how it can be that the class of GS valuations is contained in
all the above-mentioned classes, but in these classes the communication complexity severely limits
the taxation complexity. The point is that implementations of mechanisms that are specifically
tailored to GS valuations are able to find profit-maximizing bundles without learning the full menu.
However, when running those implementations in richer domains, the set of possible deviations
increases and truthfulness is lost.
Characterizing the Communication Complexity of Truthful Mechanisms
We have that in rich enough domains tax(A) ≤ poly(cc(A)). Had we were able to prove that
cc(A) ≤ poly(tax(A)), this would immediately imply that the communication complexity of a
truthful mechanism is completely determined (up to polynomial factor) by tax(A) – a well defined
combinatorial property that depends only on the social choice function.
However, we show that cc(A) cannot be bounded by poly(tax(A)). Towards this end, consider
the following (naive and incorrect) implementation of a two-player mechanism A which is truthful
for general valuations: since the menu that is presented to a player depends only on the other
player’s valuation, each player can send tax(A) bits that denote the index of the menu he presents
to the other player. The obvious next step is to ask each player to select the profit maximizing
bundle from the menu that was presented to him, announce it (using additionalm bits) and allocate
accordingly. The total communication cost of this implementation is 2(tax(A) +m) as we wanted.
The above implementation is incorrect since this last step is not well defined because of tie-
breaking: there might be several bundles that simultaneously maximize the profit. The tie-breaking
rule that defines which profit-maximizing bundle each player receives can be in principle quite
involved, and there is no way to avoid that: we show (Subsection F.2.1) a two-player mechanism
with taxation complexity 1 and communication complexity exp(m), due to tie breaking.
This leads us to the following definition. Let tie(A) be the communication complexity of
determining the allocation in a truthful mechanism A, where the input of a player is a valuation vi
and in addition all players know the menu that is presented to each player. Notice that obviously
tie(A) ≤ cc(A) since we can always ignore this extra information and simply run A to determine
the allocation. By our discussion above and our bound on the taxation complexity we get that:
3In fact, Knuth [25] shows that the number of matroid rank functions on {1, . . . ,m} is doubly exponential, and it
is known that every matroid rank function is in particular gross substitutes.
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Theorem: Let A be a two-player truthful mechanism for rich enough domain. Then,
tax(A) + tie(A)
2
≤ cc(A) ≤ 2(tax(A) +m) + tie(A)
In particular, whenever the communication complexity of the tie-breaking rule is low, we indeed
get that the communication complexity almost equals the taxation complexity.
Can we extend this theorem to more than two players? The missing component for three players
or more is that it is not clear whether it is possible to explicitly find the menu that n − 1 players
present to the remaining player with low communication (the taxation principle only guarantees
the existence of such menu, but gives no guidance on how to find it). We provide a positive answer:
The Menu Reconstruction Theorem: Let A be an n-player truthful mechanism. Fix some
player i. Then for every valuation profile v−i, there is a protocol with communication complexity
poly(tax(A), price(A),m, n) that finds the menu that is presented to player i.
Where we denote by price(A) the maximum number of bits that it takes for any n − 1 players to
find the price of a given bundle S in the menu that they present to the remaining player. Therefore:
Theorem: Let A be an n-player truthful mechanism in any domain. Then,
cc(A) ≤ poly(tax(A), price(A), tie(A),m, n)
We also show that as long as the domain includes additive valuations, price(A) ≤ cc(A). We
thus get that for rich enough domains tax(A)+tie(A)+price(A)3 ≤ cc(A), which allows us to completely
determine the communication complexity of truthful mechanisms (up to polynomial factors):
tax(A) + price(A) + tie(A)
3
≤ cc(A) ≤ poly(tax(A), price(A), tie(A),m, n)
Our characterization is tight in the sense that if we drop at least one of the three main terms
(tax(A), price(A), tie(A)) then the gap between the LHS and the RHS might be exponential. For
instance, we have already mentioned an example of a truthful mechanism A with tax(A) = 1 (and
thus price(A) = 0) in which cc(A) = exp(m). We also provide other “pathological” examples with
similar gaps when dropping either price(A) or tax(A).
Characterizing the Query Complexity
Up until now we imposed no restrictions on the communication between the parties. However,
many of the truthful mechanisms in the literature assume that the valuations are represented as
black boxes that answer only a specific type of queries. A simple type of query that was extensively
studied is a value query : given a bundle S, what is v(S)? We now characterize the number of value
queries that a truthful mechanism makes, again by applying the taxation principle.
Denote the query complexity of a truthful mechanism by val(A) – this is the number of value
queries that the most efficient implementation of A makes. Following [23], The menu complexity
of A, denoted mc(A), is roughly speaking the maximum number of bundles with finite price that
appear in any menu that is used in4 A. We establish that for mechanisms that use only value
queries, the menu complexity characterizes the query complexity in exactly the same way that the
taxation complexity characterizes the communication complexity:
4The description of the menu complexity given here is inaccurate as it ignores tie breaking issues. We refer the
reader to the technical parts of this paper for the precise definition.
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Theorem: Let A be a mechanism that is truthful for general valuations and accesses the valuations
via value queries only. Then:
mc(A) + priceval(A) + tieval(A)
3
≤ val(A) ≤ poly(mc(A), priceval(A), tieval(A),m, n)
where priceval(A) and tieval(A) are defined similarly to price(A) and tie(A) with the additional
restriction that the communication is restricted to value queries. We note that the inequality
mc(A) ≤ tax(A) is in fact implicit in [9] and [34, Theorem 11], whereas the right inequality (a
menu reconstruction theorem that uses only value queries) is new and very different from the menu
reconstruction theorem for unrestricted communication.
To strengthen the analogy between tax(A) and mc(A), consider the following two player menu
optimization problem: Alice’s input is some menu M ∈ U , where the set of menus U is known in
advance. Bob’s input is some valuation v. The goal is to find a bundle that maximizes the profit
v(S) −M(S). We restrict ourselves to one way protocols: Alice speaks first and then Bob. After
Bob speaks, both parties know a profit maximizing bundle S.
We observe that if we let U be the set of menus presented to some player in a truthful mechanism
A, the (one way) communication complexity of the menu optimization problem is tax(A) (up to
an additive factor of m bits). Interestingly, our results yield that when Bob is restricted to value
queries (Alice sends an arbitrary message, then, based on this message, the center queries for the
value of some bundles in v) then the communication complexity is essentially mc(A). That is, both
tax(A) and mc(A) capture the informational bottleneck of finding a profit-maximizing bundle in a
non-interactive way in their respective models.
The other type of popular query is demand query : given prices p1, . . . , pm return a bundle
S ∈ argmaxT v(T ) − Σj∈T pj. We identify the affinity of a mechanism as the communication
complexity of the menu optimization problem when the communication is restricted to demand
queries. Specifically, a menu M is α-min affine if there are α price vectors p1, . . . , pα and α non-
negative numbers r1, . . . , rα such that for all S, M(S) = min1≤k≤αΣj∈S(pkj ) + rk. The affinity of
A, denoted aff(A), is the maximal number α such that all menus presented by A are α-min affine.
Denote by dem(A) the number of demand queries that the most efficient implementation of
a truthful mechanism A makes. Just as tax(A) ≤ cc(A) and mc(A) ≤ val(A), we show that for
general valuations aff(A) ≤ dem(A). However, unlike tax(A) and mc(A), aff(A) cannot be used
to characterize dem(A). This is one particular consequence of an impossibility result:
Theorem (no menu reconstruction theorem for demand queries): There is a mechanism
A that is truthful for some player i with a general valuation in which dem(A) = poly(m) and
pricedem(A) = 1, but exp(m) demand queries are needed to find the menu presented to player i.
In other words, just as q value queries suffice to find a profit maximizing bundle when the menu
complexity is q, when the affinity is q a profit maximizing bundle can be found with q demand
queries. However, by our impossibility result it is not easy to figure out which q queries to make.
Nevertheless, the affinity aff(A) will be useful in some of the applications that we mention below.
The query complexity of mechanisms is studied in Section B.
Implications and Extensions
We view the study of these complexity measures as an investigation of the fundamentals of Algo-
rithmic Mechanism Design that needs no further justification. Nevertheless, as is often the case,
studying the foundations yields several interesting implications. We elaborate on some now, as well
as on some open questions. Other open questions are stated in the technical parts of the paper.
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From ex-post Nash to Dominant Strategies (Section C.1). The revelation principle implies
that any mechanism that implements a social choice function in an ex-post Nash equilibrium can be
transformed to a mechanism that implements the same social choice function in a dominant-strategy
equilibrium. However, the communication blow-up might be exponential, as in combinatorial auc-
tions with GS valuations. Our theorems allow us to obtain a new transformation that takes any
two-player mechanism that implements an ex-post Nash equilibrium in a rich enough domain to a
mechanism that implements the same social choice function in dominant-strategy equilibrium with
only a polynomial blow up in the communication complexity.
The Limits of Computationally-Efficient Truthful Mechanisms (Section C.2). A major
research direction in Algorithmic Mechanism Design studies the power of computationally efficient
truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions (e.g., [30, 27, 32, 28, 6, 14]).
For example, VCG is a truthful mechanism that maximizes the welfare, but in combinatorial auc-
tions with submodular valuations it requires exponential communication [35]. On the other hand,
there is a 1.58-approximation algorithm that uses only polynomial communication [20], but it is
not truthful. The best deterministic truthful mechanism that uses only polynomial communication
achieves a poor approximation ratio of O(
√
m) [14]. Whether this is the best possible for a deter-
ministic truthful mechanism that uses only polynomial communication is a major open question.
This state of affairs is typical to other problems as well, and we basically completely lack tools for
proving impossibility results for computationally efficient truthful mechanisms5. Our work gives
rise to two different novel approaches for proving such impossibilities.
Approach I: simultaneous algorithms. The first approach for proving impossibilities is by a reduction
to simultaneous algorithms. This model was introduced in [13]: each of the n players simultaneously
sends c bits that are a function of his valuation only. The center then determines the allocation
using only those messages. We show that impossibilities for two-player simultaneous algorithms
imply impossibilities for computationally efficient truthful mechanisms. Specifically, we show that
if there is a truthful mechanism (for the domains discussed above) that provides an approximation
ratio of α with communication complexity cc(A), then there is an α-approximation simultaneous
algorithm where the length of the simultaneous messages is poly(cc(A)). For example, a proof that
no simultaneous algorithm with polynomially long messages for submodular players achieves a 1.59
approximation (ignoring incentives issues) immediately establishes the first ever gap between com-
putationally efficient truthful mechanisms and their non-truthful counterparts. Note that strong
impossibility results for simultaneous algorithms are known [13], but those unfortunately hold only
for a large number of players. In particular, nothing is known for two players.
Approach II: lower bounds on tax(A). The second approach involves handling the taxation complex-
ity directly. The idea is simple: suppose one can prove that the taxation complexity of every truth-
ful α-approximation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular players is exponential
(ignoring computational issues). Since tax(a) ≤ poly(cc(A)), it follows that the communication
complexity of every α-approximation truthful mechanism is exponential as well, which establishes
a gap between the power of truthful and non-truthful computationally efficient algorithms.
This approach can be extended to mechanisms with restricted access. For example, to prove
impossibility results for mechanisms that use only demand queries (e.g., [10]) it suffices to show that
the affinity of every α-approximation truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submod-
ular players (ignoring computational issues) is exponential. We note that the menu complexity of
5The papers [9, 18, 16] prove impossibility results when access is restricted to value queries, or when the valuations
are given in a succinct and very specific form. For the general communication model, or even when access is restricted
to demand queries, that are no impossibility results on the power of computationally efficient truthful mechanisms.
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−ǫ-approximation mechanisms for submodular valuations was already proved to be exponential,
which indeed yielded an impossibility on the power of truthful mechanisms that use value queries
in the aforementioned setting (the direct hardness approach of [9]).
Extensions to randomized mechanisms. Before this paper, the only viable approach for proving
impossibility results for randomized mechanisms in the general communication model was by char-
acterizing all truthful mechanisms with a good approximation. Such characterizations are notori-
ously hard even for deterministic mechanisms. For randomized ones, it is probably fair to describe
the possibility of obtaining such characterizations in the foreseeable future as almost hopeless.
There are two main notions of randomized truthfulness. The first is truthfulness in expecta-
tion, where each player maximizes his expected profit. We discuss this notion below, and here we
focus on the other (stronger) notion: universal truthfulness. Universally truthful mechanisms are
simply a probability distribution over deterministic mechanisms. Interestingly, universally truthful
mechanisms achieve the best currently known approximation ratios in many important settings
(e.g., combinatorial auctions with submodular players [10] and with subadditive players [8]), even
if truthful in expectation mechanisms are considered.
Both approaches are capable of proving impossibility results for universally truthful mechanisms.
First, an impossibility for two-player randomized simultaneous algorithms implies an impossibility
for randomized truthful mechanisms. The second approach is also applicable: a lower bound on
the taxation complexity is likely to be proved by obtaining a distribution over the input on which
no mechanism with polynomial taxation complexity provides a good approximation ratio. Yao’s
principle and our results imply that for every universally truthful mechanism with polynomial
communication there is an instance on which its (expected) approximation ratio is bad.
Efficient Price Computation. Every truthful mechanism has two tasks: the first is to compute
the social choice function and the second is to compute the players’ payments. Fadel and Segal [19]
ask whether the additional communication cost of computing the payments is significantly larger
than the communication complexity of computing the social choice function. In deterministic
settings, they show that the bound is at most exponential and ask whether this is tight. Single
parameter domains are handled by [2] and various multi-parameter domains are handled by [39, 3]
via a “single call’ approach, but at the cost of introducing randomization.
We extend this line of work. Since we showed that in rich enough domains tax(A), price(A) ≤
cc(A), our menu reconstruction theorem immediately implies that fully presenting the players
with the actual menu takes only poly(cc(A)) bits, thus finding the menu is essentially as easy as
computing the allocation and the payments of winning bundles (cc(A) bits).
Truthful in Expectation Mechanisms (Section C.3). Our theorems were proved for deter-
ministic mechanisms (and thus they also apply to randomized universally truthful mechanisms).
Since truthful in expectation mechanisms were extensively studied (e.g., [28, 11, 17]), it is natural
to ask whether in truthful in expectation mechanisms tax(A) similarly characterizes cc(A). We
provide a negative answer: for combinatorial auctions with general valuations there is a truthful in
expectation mechanism with polynomial communication and exponential taxation complexity.
Recall that another setting where the taxation complexity might be exponential in the com-
munication complexity is when the valuations are gross substitutes. One can further make the
following wild speculation, which lacks more evidence and formalization: in domains where the
gap between the taxation complexity and the communication complexity is small, the performance
of computationally efficient truthful mechanisms is poor, whereas for domains where it is large,
truthfulness is not a severely limiting requirement.
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2 Bounding the Taxation Complexity: tax(A) ≤ poly(cc(A))
We would now like to bound the taxation complexity as a function of the communication complexity.
As a warm up, in Subsection 2.1 we prove that the taxation complexity of a truthful mechanism for
general valuations with communication complexity cc(A) is cc(A) + 1, as long as all bundles get a
finite price in every menu (this is true if, for example, the mechanism is deterministic and provides
some finite approximation ratio to the welfare).
In Subsection 2.2 we strengthen this result in several aspects. First, we generalize the result to
any truthful mechanism by allowing the prices of bundles to be ∞. Second, we slightly strengthen
the bound on the taxation complexity to cc(A) (and not just cc(A) + 1). Finally, we extend our
results for other classes of valuations, not just general valuations.
2.1 A Warm-up
Theorem 2.1 (warm-up theorem, inferior to the result of Subsection 2.2) Consider a truth-
ful mechanism A. Suppose that for each player i, bundle S, and menu M that might be presented
to player i we have that M(S) <∞. Then, tax(A) ≤ cc(A) + 1.
Proof: Fix some player i. Let the taxation complexity of player i be the logarithm of the number
of menus that player i might be presented with in A. We will prove that the taxation complexity
of player i is at most cc(A) + 1 and the theorem will follow.
Define a protocol A’ that is completely identical to the most efficient implementation of A (in
particular, the same allocation and payment functions), except that at the end of A′ player i sends
the bit 1 if his profit is positive (i.e., Ai(v) − pi(v) > 0) and the bit 0 otherwise. Note that A′
is truthful since A is truthful and that that the communication complexity of A′ is cc(A) + 1. In
addition, for each set of valuations v−i of the other players the menu presented to i is identical in
both A and A′. Therefore it suffices to prove that the taxation complexity of player i in A′ is at
most cc(A′). This implies that the taxation complexity of A is cc(A) + 1.
With this in mind, letM i = {M|∃(v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . vn) s.t. M is presented to i} be the set
of all possible menus that might be presented to player i. For eachM ∈M i, let vMi be the valuation
in which for every S we have that vMi (S) = M(S). Observe that each vMi is a valid valuation
function: by Proposition A.4,M is monotone and normalized, thus vMi is monotone and normalized
as well. Also notice that for each S, vMi (S) <∞ sinceM(S) <∞. In addition, for everyM ∈M i
choose an arbitrary set of valuations of the other players vM−i = (v
M
1 , . . . , v
M
i−1, v
M
i+1, . . . , v
M
n ) such
that if the players’ valuations are vM−i the menu that player i is presented with is M.
Now we get to the heart of the proof. We will show that for each M,M′ ∈ M i, M 6= M′,
the transcript of A′ in the instance (vMi , v
M
−i ) differs from the transcript of A
′ in the instance
(vM
′
i , v
M′
−i ). Recall that the communication complexity of A
′ is cc(A) + 1, thus there are at most
2cc(A)+1 different transcripts. The bound on the taxation complexity of A′ will then follow since
every instance of the form (vMi , v
M
−i ) corresponds to exactly one menu M ∈M i.
Claim 2.2 For everyM,M′ ∈M i,M 6=M′, the transcript of A′ in the instance (vMi , vM−i ) differs
from the transcript of A′ in the instance (vM
′
i , v
M′
−i ).
Proof: Assume towards contradiction that there are M,M′ ∈ M i, M 6= M′ such that the
transcript of the instance (vM−i ,M) is identical to the transcript of the instance (vM
′
−i ,M′). Us-
ing standard fooling-set arguments (e.g., [26]), this implies that the transcripts of (vM−i ,M′) and
(vM
′
−i ,M) are identical as well. We will show that this is not the case and reach a contradiction.
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Towards this end, observe that the last bit that player i sends in both instances is by construction
0 (since vMi (S) =M(S) and vM
′
i (S) =M′(S) for every bundle S, so the profit in both instances
is 0). However, we will show that in either (vMi , v
M′
−i ) or (v
M′
i , v
M
−i ) the last bit that player i sends
is 1. In particular we get a different transcript, which is a contradiction.
To see that in one of the instances (vMi , v
M′
−i ) and (v
M′
i , v
M
−i ) the last bit that is communicated
is 1, notice that since M 6= M′, there must be a bundle S such that M(S) 6= M′(S). Assume
without loss of generality thatM(S) >M′(S). Thus in the instance (vM′i , vM−i ) the profit of player
1 for the bundle S is vMi (S) −M′(S) > 0. By the taxation principle, player i must win a bundle
with at least that (positive) profit. Thus the last bit that player i communicates is 1, which gives
us the desired contradiction.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Tightness. To see that the Theorem 2.1 is essentially tight, we present a mechanism with taxation
complexity very close to the communication complexity. Consider the following truthful mechanism
for combinatorial auctions with two players, Alice and Bob. Let MBob = {M1, . . . ,M2c} be a set
of 2c menus, where for each Mi ∈ MBob we have that Mi({a}) = i, Mi(∅) = 0, and Mi(S) = ∞
for every S 6= ∅, {a}. Let t be Alice’s value for item a rounded to the nearest integer in 1, 2, . . . , 2c.
Alice now sends t using c bits of communication. If Bob’s value for item a is at least t, Bob
sends the bit 1, receives a, and pays t. Otherwise, he sends the bit 0, receives no items at all,
and pays nothing. Alice always receives the empty bundle. The mechanism is clearly truthful, its
communication complexity c+ 1, and its taxation complexity is c.
2.2 Bounding the Taxation Complexity: The Full Result
We now significantly strengthen the results of Subsection 2.1. In particular, we give bounds on
the taxation complexity also for mechanisms that are truthful for restricted classes of valuations
(subadditive, XOS, and submodular). We will show that:
Theorem 2.3 Let V be some class of valuations. Fix a mechanism A for combinatorial auctions
that is truthful when the valuations of the players are in V. Then:
1. If V is the set of all normalized and monotone valuations then tax(A) ≤ cc(A).
2. If V is the set of subadditive valuations then tax(A) ≤ cc(A).
3. If V is the set of XOS valuations then tax(A) ≤ m · (cc(A) + 1).
4. If V is the set of submodular valuations then tax(A) ≤ d · m · (cc(A) + 1), where d =
|{M(S)}M∈M i ,S| is the total number of distinct prices that appear in some menu.
The proof of Theorem 2.3 is postponed to Appendix D due to lack of space. We note that the vast
majority of the algorithms in the literature are truthful for general valuations (e.g., maximal in
range algorithms, posted prices mechanisms). The restrictions on the valuations are typically used
only for the performance analysis. The taxation complexity of those mechanisms is therefore at
most their communication complexity. We also remark that the bound on the taxation complexity
for submodular valuations depends on the number of possible prices. A natural open question is:
Open Question 1 Let A be a mechanism for combinatorial auctions that is truthful for submod-
ular valuations. Is tax(A) ≤ poly(cc(A),m)?
More generally, we have already mentioned two domains in which there is a truthful mechanism A
with tax(A) >> cc(A). The first was combinatorial auctions with gross substitute valuations. For
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combinatorial auctions with general valuations we mentioned a randomized truthful in expectation
mechanism, but this mechanism (as well as all truthful in expectation mechanisms) can be seen as
a deterministic one by letting the range be the set of all possible distributions over allocations and
letting the value of a player for a distribution be the expected value of the bundle he receives in
that distribution. This leads us to the following question:
Open Question 2 Characterize the set of domains in which for every truthful mechanism A we
have that tax(A) ≤ poly(cc(A),m).
3 Menu Reconstruction: cc(A) ≤ poly(tax(A), price(A), tie(A), m, n)
Our goal in this section is to provide a characterization of the communication complexity of truthful
mechanisms. Our first task is to develop a low communication protocol that lets n− 1 players find
the menu they present to the remaining player.
Theorem 3.1 (The Menu Reconstruction Theorem) Fix a truthful mechanism A. Denote
by v−i the valuation profile of all players except i. The communication complexity of finding the
index of the menu presented to i by v−i is poly(tax(A), price(A),m, n).
In the statement of the theorem, we denote by price(A) is the communication complexity of the
following (n − 1)-player problem: fix some truthful mechanism A, player i, and bundle S. The
input of each player i′ 6= i is a valuation vi′ . Let M be the menu that is presented to i in A when
the valuations are v−i. price(A) is the communication complexity of computing M(S).
Due to lack of space, we bring the proof of the theorem in Appendix E. We note that although for
concreteness the menu reconstruction theorem is proved for combinatorial auctions, it actually ap-
plies to any domain. That is, fix any truthful n-player mechanism A whose range is a set of alterna-
tives A. Then, the menu presented to any player can be found using poly(tax(A), price(A), log |A|, n)
bits (again, price(A) is the communication complexity of finding the price of an alternative S ∈ A).
We now want to express the communication complexity of menu reconstruction in terms of
cc(A). Proposition F.1 shows that if A is truthful for additive valuations, then price(A) ≤ cc(A).
Since Theorem 2.3 gives us that for general valuations tax(A) ≤ cc(A), we get that finding the full
menu is not much harder than determining the allocation and the prices of the winning bundles:
Corollary 3.2 Fix a mechanism A that is truthful for general valuations. Denote by v−i the
valuation profile of all players except i. The communication complexity of finding the index of the
menu presented to i by v−i is poly(cc(A),m, n).
Similar bounds also hold for other valuation classes, by using Theorem 2.3 appropriately.
More importantly, we can now characterize the communication complexity of truthful mecha-
nisms. Let tie(A) be the communication complexity of determining the allocation of A when the
valuation of each player i is vi and all players know the menu Mi player i is presented with by
v−i
6. Notice that tie(A) ≤ cc(A), since we can always run A and ignore the extra information about
the Mi’s. This gives a characterization of the communication complexity of mechanisms that are
truthful for general valuations (again, similar bounds hold by applying other parts of Theorem 2.3):
6The notation tie(A) hints that this is a question about tie breaking: each player must be allocated a profit
maximizing bundle and the set of profit maximizing bundles can be computed without additional communication
as it depends on Mi and vi only. However, deciding which specific bundle in the set the player is allocated might
depend also on the valuations of the other players and might require extra communication.
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Theorem 3.3 (characterization of the communication complexity of truthful mechanisms)
Fix a mechanism A that is truthful for general valuations. Then:
tax(A) + price(A) + tie(A)
3
≤ cc(A) ≤ poly(tax(A), price(A), tie(A),m, n)
Proof: We first prove the LHS. We always have that tie(A) ≤ cc(A). A is truthful for gen-
eral valuations and hence it is also truthful for additive valuations, therefore by Proposition F.1,
price(A) ≤ cc(A). To finish this part, observe that by Theorem 2.3, tax(A) ≤ cc(A).
The RHS is obtained by applying the menu reconstruction theorem n times, once for each
player. Then, we need additional tie(A) communication bits to determine the final allocation.
In Subsection F.2 we show that our characterization is tight in the sense that if we drop at
least one of the three main terms (tax(A), price(A), tie(A)) then the gap between the LHS and
the RHS might be exponential. For instance, we have already mentioned an example of a truthful
mechanism A with tax(A) = 1 (and thus price(A) = 0) in which cc(A) = exp(m). We also provide
examples with similar gaps when dropping price(A) and tax(A).
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A Formalities
A.1 Combinatorial Auctions
In a combinatorial auction there is a set M items (|M | = m) and a set of N players (|N | = n).
Each player i has a valuation function vi : 2
M → R that denotes the value of player i for every
possible subset of the items. We assume that the valuation functions are monotone (for all S ⊆ T ,
vi(S) ≥ vi(T )) and normalized (vi(∅) = 0). The output is an allocation of the items (S1, . . . , Sn).
We will sometimes consider additional restrictions on the valuations:
1. Additive: a valuation v is additive if for every bundle S we have that v(S) = Σj∈Sv({j}).
2. Submodular: a valuation v is submodular if for every two bundles S and T it holds that
v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
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3. XOS: a valuation v is XOS if there exist additive valuations a1, . . . , at such that for every
bundle S, v(S) = maxr ar(S). Each ar is a clause of v. If a ∈ argmaxr ar(S) then a is a
maximizing clause of S and a(j) is the supporting price of item j in this maximizing clause.
4. Subadditive: a valuation v is subadditive if for every two bundles S and T it holds that
v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ).
It is known [29] that each class defined above contains its predecessors, and that these contain-
ments are strict.
A.2 Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium and Dominant Strategies
Consider a general iterative (not necessarily direct) mechanism for n players. Denote the type space
of player i by Ti and the set of possible alternatives by A. The mechanism works in r rounds (we
restrict ourselves to finite mechanisms with r <∞), where in each round r′ each player i observes
the actions chosen by all players (including himself) in the previous rounds and chooses an action
for this round from a set Xi. Let Hr′ denote the set of all possible actions played by all players in
rounds 1, . . . , r′, i.e., the history of the game in rounds 1, . . . , r′.
The output of the game is determined by A : Hr → A. Each player i has a valuation function
vi : Ti ×A → R. There are also payment functions pi : Hr → R. In this paper we assume that the
utility function ui of player i is quasi linear: vi(ti, A(hr))− pi(hr), where ti is the type of player i,
and hr is the history of the game. Thus, a strategy si is simply a set of functions s
1
i , . . . , s
r
i where
each sr
′
i : Ti × Hr′−1 → Xi determines the action of player i in round r′ given his type and the
history. We will sometime use h(s1, . . . , sn) to denote the history of the game where each player i
plays according to the strategy si. We define two notions of equilibria:
Definition A.1 (dominant strategy equilibrium) A strategy si is a dominant strategy for
player i if for every ti and s−i, ui(ti, h(si, s−i)) ≥ ui(ti, h(s′i, s−i)) for all s′i. Strategies (s1, . . . , sn)
constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium if each si is dominant.
Definition A.2 (ex-post Nash equilibrium) For each player i, let si be a function that takes
player i’s type and outputs a strategy. (s1, . . . , sn) constitute an ex-post Nash equilibrium if for every
player i with type ti and every type profile t−i of the other players it holds that ui(ti, h(si(ti), s−i(t−i))) ≥
ui(ti, h(s
′
i(t
′
i), s−i(t−i))) for all t
′
i ∈ Ti.
In this paper we use the term truthful to denote mechanisms that reach an ex-post Nash
equilibrium. Observe that every dominant strategy equilibrium is also an ex-post Nash equilibrium,
but the other direction is not true: consider a second price auction with two players where the value
of each player i for the item is vi. As usual, each player i submits a bid bi, the item goes to the
player with the highest bid who pays the bid of the other player. If the players submit their
bids simultaneously, then of course setting bi = vi is a dominant strategy for each of the players.
However, consider an iterative game where player 1 bids first and player 2 bids after he sees b1. In
this game, setting b1 = v1 is no longer a dominant strategy for player 1. To see that, consider the
following strategy of player 2: if b1 = 1 player 2 sets b2 = 0.99 and otherwise b2 = 1. Notice that
given this strategy if v1 > 1 player 1 is better off bidding b1 = 1 rather than b1 = v1. However, the
set of strategies where each player i bids bi = vi does constitute an ex-post Nash equilibrium.
This paper follows the usual formulation of combinatorial auctions as a game. We identify
between the type space and the valuation function, so vi is the private information of each player
i. The set of alternatives A is the set of all possible allocations.
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A.3 Menus, the Taxation Principle, and Taxation Complexity
A key component of this paper is the taxation principle. The taxation principle holds for every
domain, but for convenience we specialize it here for combinatorial auctions:
Proposition A.3 (taxation principle) Consider some mechanism A for combinatorial auctions
and let (s1, . . . , sn) be an ex-post Nash equilibrium in this mechanism. Fix some player i and v−i.
Then, for every bundle S there is a price pS such that for every vi, when the players play according
to (si(vi), s−i(v−i)) and player i wins S, the payment of player i is pS.
Proof: Consider vi and v
′
i such that player i is allocated S when the players play according to
both (si(vi), s−i(v−i)) and (si(v
′
i), s−i(v−i)), and charged p and p
′, respectively. If p 6= p′, suppose
without loss of generality that p > p′. Notice that the profit of player i with valuation vi is vi(S)−p
when playing according to si(vi). However, if player i plays according to si(v
′
i) he still wins the
bundle S but pays only p′, so his profit is vi(S)−p′ > vi(S)−p. A contradiction to the assumption
that the profile (s1, . . . , sn) is an ex-post Nash equilibrium.
We set pS = ∞ if for some S there is no vi such that when the players play according to
(si(vi), s−i(v−i)) and player i is allocated S. Note that the taxation principle gives a natural
interpretation to any ex-post Nash equilibrium: each player i is presented with a menu M : 2M →
R ∪ {∞} that depends only on v−i. In equilibrium, player i is assigned a bundle that maximizes
his profit argmaxS vi(S)−M(S). We will say that M is presented to player i by v−i.
Proposition A.4 (menu monotonicity) Consider some truthful mechanism A for combinato-
rial auctions and let (s1, . . . , sn) be an ex-post Nash equilibrium in this mechanism. Fix some player
i and v−i. Let M be the menu presented to player i by v−i. Then, without loss of generality we
can assume that M is monotone: for every S ⊆ T , M(T ) ≥ M(S). Furthermore, we can assume
without loss of generality that A is normalized: M(∅) = 0.
Proof: We first prove that M is monotone. Suppose that M(T ) < M(S). Then, for every
vi, vi(S) −M(S) < vi(T ) −M(T ) since by the monotonicity of the valuations v(T ) ≥ v(S). In
other words, player i never wins the bundle T . Therefore, in this case setting M(S) = M(T ) is
consistent with the social choice function: the profit from S is at least the profit from T , so we may
have only increased the set of most profitable bundles, and we can still assume by tie-breaking that
T is never chosen.
As for normalization, ifM(∅) 6= 0, define a new menuM′ withM′(S) =M(S)−M′(∅). Notice
that we may assume that player i is presented withM′ and not withM since shifting all prices by
a constant does not change the set of profit maximizing bundles.
Denote by M i = {Mv−i}v−i the set of menus that might be presented to i. Denote by tax(A)
the taxation complexity of a truthful mechanism A – the number of bits needed to represent an
index of a specific menu among the set of menus that may be presented to a player. That is,
tax(A) = maxi log |M i|. We sometimes also refer to log |M i| as the taxation complexity of player i.
A.4 Computational Models
This paper considers three ways in which the players communicate, which correspond to three ways
of accessing the valuation functions:
• Value queries: Each valuation v is represented by a black box that can answer only the
following question: given S, what is v(S)?
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• Demand queries: Each valuation v is represented by a black box that can answer only the
following question: given prices per item p1, . . . , pm, what is a profit maximizing bundle
S ∈ argmax v(T ) − Σj∈Tpj? If there are several bundles that maximize the profit we use a
fixed tie breaking rule to determine which bundle will be returned (say, the lexicographically
first one). For simplicity we assume that the value v(T ) is also returned.
• General communication: This is the usual number-in-hand communication model (see [26])
where we assume that the input of player i is his valuation vi. At each round, each player i
decides which bits he sends based on vi and the bits sent by all players in the previous rounds.
If the players communicate only by answering demand or value queries, then the complexity of
the mechanism is the largest number of queries that the mechanism makes over all inputs. In the
general communication model the complexity of the mechanism is the largest number of bits that
the players send. In all models, the maximum is taken over all possible inputs.
Notice that each way corresponds to a different restriction on the action space in the game
theoretic formulation. I.e., if the valuations can only be accessed by value queries, then the action
space consists only of answering a value query.
A.4.1 Representation of Numbers
We would like to explicitly discuss the delicate issue of representing numbers, which is step-sided in
many of the previous works on algorithmic mechanism design and communication complexity. In
general, we follow the standard formulation (see, e.g., [5, 34, 19, 2]) and assume that all numbers
(in particular the values and prices) are limited to a certain precision, i.e., are represented by some
number of bits k. We limit our attention to protocols that take a precision parameter k with the
following property: let Pk and Pk′ be the same protocol except that the precision parameter is
either k or k′, where k′ < k. We require that when the input can be represented by at most k′
bits of precision, the output (allocation and prices) is identical in Pk and Pk′ . Notice that the
complexity of the mechanism should also take k into account, although we will mostly think about
the precision k as fixed. To the best of our knowledge, all protocols that were considered in the
Algorithmic Mechanism Design literature have this property.
We sometimes let B be the maximum price that may appear in a menu. Notice that since all
prices are represented by a finite number of bits, B is well defined. In some proofs (e.g., proof
of Theorem 2.3) we use valuations in which some of the values of the bundles are a function of
B (e.g., v(S) = 2 · B). One issue is that the number of bits needed to represent these values is
bigger than k. However, since all numbers we use are not larger than 2m · B (and usually much
smaller), whenever we analyze valuations that use k bits of precision, we use protocols that allow
the representation of m · k bits of precision, which allow representation of values such that 2m ·B.
Notice that if the communication complexity depends polynomially on the precision parameter k,
the overall communication blow-up due to the use of increased precision is only poly(m).
A.5 Chernoff Bounds
We will need the following version of the Chernoff bounds:
Proposition A.5 (Chernoff bounds) Let X1, ...Xn be independent random variables that take
values in {0, 1}, such that for all i, Pr[Xi = 1] = p for some p. Then, the following holds, for
0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1:
1. Pr[ΣiXi > (1 + ǫ)pn] ≤ e−pnǫ2/3
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2. Pr[ΣiXi < (1− ǫ)pn] ≤ e−pnǫ2/2
B Characterizing the Query Complexity of Truthful Mechanisms
In this section we handle mechanisms that can access the valuations only with restricted type of
queries. For value queries, we show that the menu complexity characterizes the query complexity
in exactly the same way that the taxation complexity characterizes the communication complexity.
For demand queries, we show an impossibility result: a menu reconstruction theorem for demand
queries does not exist. Nevertheless, we are able to characterize the structure of the menu in that
case, in a way that sheds lights on the interplay between the number of queries and the semantics
of the mechanism. We will also see that this characterization is useful for proving impossibility
results on the power of truthful computationally efficient mechanisms.
In both settings we develop our results for mechanisms that are truthful for general valuations.
However, extending the results also for other valuations classes should be possible by applying the
ideas similar to the proof of Theorem 2.3.
B.1 Value Queries
We now consider mechanisms in which the players’ valuations are represented by black boxes that
can only answer value queries. In this setting, the analogue of taxation complexity will be the
menu complexity. That is, let Mi be the set of menus that might be presented to player i in some
truthful mechanism A. Roughly speaking, the menu complexity of a menu M that is presented to
player i measures the number of bundles S that i might win. The exact definition is a bit more
delicate: suppose that the menuM presented to player i is identically zero. If player i’s valuation is
identically zero as well he might win any bundle in case we have some strange tie-breaking rule that
depends on the valuations of the other players. To overcome this tie-breaking issue we essentially
need to consider only bundles S that player i might win when his valuation is strictly monotone.
We note that in this section we assume without loss of generality that the menu is monotone in
the sense of Proposition A.4.
Definition B.1 (menu complexity) Let A be some truthful mechanism. Consider some menu
M that is presented to player i when the valuations of the other players are v−i = (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn).
We say that bundle S 6= M is in M if for every T ⊃ S we have that M(S) <M(T ). The grand
bundle M is in the menu if M(M) <∞.
The menu complexity of M, denoted mc(M) is the number of bundles that are in a menu M.
The menu complexity of A is mc(A) = maximaxM∈M i mc(M).
It is not hard to see that equivalently we could have defined the menu complexity of a menu
M to be:
mc(M) = {S|∃v ∈ V ′ such that A awards i the bundle S in the instance (v, v−i)}
where V ′ is the set of strictly monotone valuations.
Denote by val(A) the maximum number of value queries that the most efficient implementation
of A makes on any input.
B.1.1 Bounding the Query Complexity: mc(A) ≤ val(A)
Our first theorem shows that the menu complexity is at most the query complexity:
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Theorem B.2 Let A be a mechanism that is truthful for general valuations and uses only value
queries. Then, mc(A) ≤ val(A) + 2.
A weaker variant of this theorem can be obtained as a special case of Theorem B.16 that we later
prove by setting α = 0 and β = val(A). In fact, Theorem B.2 is also implicit in [9] and [34,
Theorem 11]. We bring the explicit proof here:
Proof: (of Theorem B.2) Fix a truthful mechanism A, some player i, and valuations v−i =
(v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn) of all other players. Let M be the menu that is presented to player i in
A by v−i. Let vi be the valuation that is defined by vi(S) = M(S) for every S with M(S) < ∞.
For every S withM(S) =∞ we set vi(S) to be an arbitrary value (which is strictly bigger than any
finite price in M). We will show that in the instance (vi, v−i) any implementation of the truthful
mechanism A makes at least mc(M)− 2 value queries, and the theorem will follow.
Let S′ be the bundle that player i is awarded in the instance (vi, v−i). Consider some bundle
S 6= S′, S 6= ∅ that is in the menu M (there are at most mc(A) − 2 such bundles). We will show
that in the instance (vi, v−i) the mechanism A queries vi(S) and finish the proof. Suppose not. Let
v′i be the valuation that is identical to vi except that v
′
i(S) = vi(S)+ǫ, for some ǫ > 0 that preserves
the monotonicity of v′i. Such ǫ > 0 exists since S is in the menu M. Notice that if A does not
query vi(S), it cannot distinguish between the valuations vi and v
′
i. Therefore player i receives the
bundle S′ also in the instance (v′i, v−i). However, the profit from the bundle S is v
′
i(S)−M(S) =
vi(S) + ǫ−M(S) = ǫ > 0 whereas the profit from S′ is v′i(S) −M(S) = vi(S) −M(S) = 0. I.e.,
player i is not awarded his most profitable bundle, a contradiction to the taxation principle.
Tightness. To see that Theorem B.2 is essentially tight (i.e., there is a mechanism with menu
complexity very close to the number of value queries it makes), consider the following truthful mech-
anism for combinatorial auctions with two players, Alice and Bob. Fix some set T = {T1, . . . , Tc}
of bundles, none of them is the empty bundle. Let t be Alice’s value for item a rounded to the
nearest integer in 1, 2, . . . , c (determining t can be done by making one value query). Set the price
of each bundle S ∈ T, S 6= Tt to |S|. Set the price of Tt to |Tt|+ 12 . Bob receives the bundle from
the set T that maximizes his profit according to these prices (breaking ties in some consistent way)
and pays the appropriate price, unless it has a negative profit, in which case he is allocated no
items at all. Alice never receives any items.
The mechanism is clearly truthful, uses c+ 1 value queries (determining the profit-maximizing
bundle requires c value queries, one for each bundle in T ). Its menu complexity is c.
B.1.2 Menu Reconstruction and Characterization
We now provide a menu reconstruction theorem that uses only value queries. Let priceval(A) be
defined similarly to the definition of price(A) in Section 3 but with respect to value queries.
Theorem B.3 (a menu reconstruction theorem for value queries) Fix a truthful mechanism
A that makes only value queries. Let v−i be the valuations of all players except i. The index of the
menu presented to i by v−i can be found by making poly(mc(A), priceval(A),m) value queries.
Proof: A valuation v is k-useless if there exist (not necessarily unique) sets K1, . . . ,Kk such that
v can be described as follows:
v(S) =
{
0 ∃t : S ⊆ Kt,
1 otherwise.
We call each Kt a useless bundle of v.
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Suppose that we are given a valuation v on m items that can be accessed via value queries
only. We are guaranteed that v is k-useless, but we do not know K1, . . . ,Kk. We would like to
learn the k-useless valuation v, that is, obtain an algorithm that makes value queries only and
finds K1, . . . ,Kk. The next claim shows that an algorithm for learning k-useless valuations yields
a menu reconstruction theorem:
Claim B.4 Let qk be the query complexity of learning k-useless valuations. The index of the menu
presented to i by v−i can be found by making poly(mc(A), priceval(A), qmc(A),m) value queries.
Proof: LetM be the menu presented by v−i to player i. For every price p, define a valuation vp:
vp(S) =
{
0 M(S) ≤ p,
1 M(S) > p.
Notice that we can easily simulate a value query vp(S) using priceval(A) value queries: compute
M(S) by making priceval(A) value queries, and determine whether vp(S) is 0 or 1 accordingly.
The motivation to the definition of vp comes from the following observation: let S is a bundle
that is in M. Let p = M(S). Then S is one of the useless bundles of vp. This is simply because
vp(S) = 0 by definition, and since for every j /∈ S we have that M(S + {j}) > p and thus
vp(S + {j}) = 1, precisely because S is in the menu M. Similarly, if S′ is a useless bundle of vp,
then S′ is in M. This shows that for every p, vp is a mc(A)-useless valuation.
It is also easy to see that if there is some bundle S with M(S) = p then there is some bundle
S′ that is in M with M(S′) = p: start with S, and check if there is some item j /∈ S such that
M(S) = M(S + {j}). If not, then S is in the menu, else, repeat the process but now with the
bundle S + {j} instead of S. The process stops after at most |M − S| additions of items with a
bundle that is in M and has price p, simply because we run out of items to add.
We can now run the following natural algorithm to find all bundles that are in M. First,
consider v0 and use qk value queries to v
0 (each costs priceval(A) “real” value queries to v−i) to
determine the useless bundles of v0. Notice that the set of useless bundles is not empty, since
M(∅) = 0. We have already observed above that the set of useless bundles of v0 contains only
bundles that are in M, and furthermore contains all bundles that are in M with price 0.
Now we find the minimal price p of some bundle in M that is bigger than 0. Denote the value
query complexity by r. Define vp and as before use qk · priceval(A) value queries to find all the
sets that are in M and have price p. The process will stop after mc(A) iterations, since there are
at most mc(A) distinct prices in M (recall that if there is a bundle S with price M(S) = p then
there is a bundle in M with price p). At the end of the process we have found all mc(A) bundles
that are in the menu. Use priceval(A) to determine the price of each of them.
The total number of value queries is therefore mc(A) · (r+qk ·priceval(A))+mc(A) ·priceval(A).
To finish the proof we prove that r ≤ qk.
Claim B.5 Any algorithm that learns a k-useless valuation vp that is obtained from v as above
must query at least one set S with M(S) = minS′:M(S′)>pM(S′) = p′.
Proof: LetM′ be the menu that is identical to M except for bundle each S with M(S) = p′ for
which we have that M′(S) = p. Notice that M′ is monotone since M is monotone and since there
is no bundle S with p < M(S) < p′. Notice that the algorithm for learning a k-useless valuation
will not notice the difference between M andM′ (since we only changed the prices of bundles that
were not queried), thus the set of useless bundles it returns is the same. However, the valuation v′p
obtained from M′ has at least one additional useless bundle (recall that if there is a bundle with
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priceM(S) then there is a bundle in the menu with the same price). This is a contradiction to the
correctness of the algorithm that learns k-useless valuations.
I.e., we can compute minS′:M(S′)>pM(S′) just by running the algorithm for learning a k-useless
valuation on vp, and take the minimal value that is strictly bigger than p that was encountered
when the valuation v was queried. Thus, we can conclude that the index of the menu presented to
player i can be found with at most mc(A) · qk · priceval(A) +mc(A) · priceval(A) value queries.
All that is left is to show that qk from the statement of the claim can be bounded from above
by poly(mc(A), priceval(A),m). We now give a recursive algorithm for learning a valuation v that
is k-useless.
FindUseless(S,Allowed)
1. If S is useless then return S.
2. If v(S) = 1 then return ∅.
3. Initialize UselessBundles = ∅.
4. For each item j ∈ Allowed:
(a) Remove j from Allowed.
(b) Add FindUseless(S + {j}, Allowed) to UselessBundles.
5. Return UselessBundles.
We will now see that running FindUseless(∅,M) returns the set of all useless bundles:
Claim B.6 FindUseless(S,Allowed) returns the set of useless bundles that contain S and are
contained in S +Allowed.
Proof: We prove this by induction on the size of Allowed. If Allowed = ∅ then indeed
FindUseless(S, ∅) returns S if and only if S is useless.
Assume correctness for |Allowed| = l and prove for |Allowed| = l+1. If S is useless or v(S) = 1
then the FindUseless correctly terminates in the first two lines. To analyze the other case, suppose
without loss of generality that Allowed = {1, 2, 3, . . . , |Allowed|}. The main loop will first add to
the set UselessBundles all useless bundles that are contained in S +Allowed and contain both S
and item 1 (applying the induction hypothesis), then all useless bundles that contain item 2 but
not item 1, then all useless bundles that contain item 3 but not items 1, 2 and so on. The claim
is completed since every useless bundle that contains S and is contained in S +Allowed must fall
into one of these disjoint categories.
Claim B.7 The total number of value queries that FindUseless(∅,M) makes is poly(k,m).
Proof: Observe that if the call FindUseless(S,Allowed) was executed (S is “visited”), there will
be no other call to FindUselss(S,Allowed′), for any value ofAllowed′. Furthermore, FindUseless(S,Allowed)
calls only to FindUseless(S+j,Allowed′). Thus, the set of bundles that are visited is a tree rooted
at ∅. Notice that the leafs of the trees are either useless bundles or bundles that are valued 1. Fur-
thermore, each leaf S with value 1 was called from some node S − {j} (for some j) with value 0
and is on a path to a useless bundle.
Since there are at most k useless bundles and since the length of the path from a root to a
useless bundle is at most m, we get that the total number of bundles that are on a path from the
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root to a useless set is at most m · k. Each such bundle has at most m neighbors with value 1 in
the tree, so the total number of bundles that the algorithm visits is at most m2 · k.
Notice that, ignoring recursive calls, each call to FindUseless(S,Allowed) makes at most m+1
value queries (in the first two lines, at most m queries to check whether S is useless an additional
one for v(S)). The total number of value queries that FindUseless(∅,M) therefore makes is at
most (m+ 1) ·m2 · k.
All this gives us that qk ≤ poly(k,m). This completes the proof of Theorem B.3.
Define tieval(A) in an analogous way to tie(A) (see definition in Section 3). We conclude:
Theorem B.8 (characterization of the value query complexity of truthful mechanisms)
Fix a mechanism A that makes only value queries and is truthful for general valuations. Then:
mc(A) + priceval(A) + tieval(A)
3
≤ val(A) ≤ poly(mc(A), priceval(A), tieval(A),m, n)
The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3 and is omitted.
B.2 Demand Queries
In this section we consider mechanisms that access the valuations via demand and value queries
only (but recall that a value query can be simulated by a polynomial number of value queries [5]).
B.2.1 An Impossibility Result for Menu Reconstruction
Up until now, we have showed two menu reconstruction theorems. The first one (Theorem 3.1)
showed that we can find the menu using poly(tax(A), price(A),m, n) communication. The second
one (Theorem B.3) uses poly(mc(A), priceval(A),m) value queries. In particular, for rich enough
domain the running time of menu reconstruction is within a polynomial factor of the running time
of the truthful mechanism.
We now show that no analogous result exists if the mechanism accesses the valuations using
demand queries only. Specifically, we will show that if player i’s valuation is general, then there
is a two-player mechanism A with pricedem(A) = 1 that makes poly(m) demand queries but that
reconstructing the menu presented to player i takes exp(m) demand queries.
Theorem B.9 There is a two-player mechanism A that is truthful for player 2 with a general
valuation such that dem(A) = poly(m) but finding the menu presented to player 2 requires exp(m)
demand queries to player 1’s valuation.
Proof: Let MT be the following menu, for every T such that |T | = m2 :
MT (S) =
{
|S| S 6= T
|S|+ 12 S = T
The mechanism is defined as follows. Player 1 never gets any items. Player 2 receives his profit-
maximizing bundle from MT , where ties are arbitrarily broken. The identity of T will depend on
player 1’s valuation, but we will have that pricedem(A) = 1. We first show that by making poly(m)
demand queries we can find player 2’s profit maximizing bundle, even if T is unknown in advance.
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An Algorithm for finding a profit maximizing bundle. Start with a demand query with a
price per item of 1. Let S0 be the profit maximizing bundle returned by that demand query. Use
pricedem(A) demand queries to check whether S0 = T , which happens if and only if MT (S0) =
m
2 +
1
2 . If S0 6= T , then we will show that S0 is a profit maximizing bundle.
If S0 = T , run additional m demand queries. First, we run the following
m
2 demand queries,
one for each item j ∈ T : in the j’th query the price of item j is ∞ and the price of every other
item is 1. Let R1 be the profit maximizing bundle among the results of all these
m
2 queries. The
second batch of m2 demand queries, one for each j /∈ T , sets a price 12 for item j, a price 0 for every
item j ∈ T and price of 1 for all other items. Let R2 be the profit maximizing bundle among the
results of all queries in the second batch. We now show that one of S,R1, R2 is a profit maximizing
bundle.
Lemma B.10 Even if T is unknown, the algorithm finds a profit-maximizing bundle by making
m+ 1 + pricedem(A) demand queries.
Proof: We first show that if S 6= T then indeed S is a profit maximizing bundle. To see
that, observe that by the result of the first demand query we have that for all S′, v2(S) − |S| ≥
v2(S
′)−|S′| ≥ v2(T )−|T | > v2(T )−|T |− 12 . Thus, we get that v2(S)−MT (S) ≥ v2(S′)−MT (S′)
for all S′, as needed.
We now show that if S = T then one of S,R1, R2 is a profit maximizing bundle. We first claim
that among all bundles that do not contain T , R1 is a profit maximizing bundle. Denote by Q the
profit maximizing bundle among all bundles that do not contain T . Since Q does not contain T ,
there is some item j ∈ Q such that j /∈ T . Consider the demand query that sets the price of j to be
∞ (and the price of every other item to be 1). Let Q′ be the bundle it returns. We have that for
all S′ that do not contain j, v2(Q
′) − |Q′| ≥ v2(S′) − |S′|. Since we also have by assumption that
v2(Q)− |Q| ≥ v2(Q′)− |Q′|. By the way we choose R1, the profit of Q is at most the profit of R1.
We now show that R2 is a profit maximizing bundle among all bundles that contain T . Denote
by Q some bundle with a profit maximizing bundle among all those that contain T . If the profit of
T is at least the profit of Q then we are done, because the algorithm chooses a profit maximizing
bundle among T,R1, R2. Thus, assume that Q is strictly more profitable than T , hence Q strictly
contains T . Let j ∈ Q be some item such that j /∈ T .
Consider the j’th demand query in the second batch and denote by Q′ its answer. Notice that
the bundle Q′ ∪ T has at least the same profit as the bundle Q′, simply by the monotonicity of the
valuations and since the price of every item in T is 0. Also notice that in this demand query the
price of every bundle S′ that contains T and j is exactly MT (S′)−MT (T ). Thus, the profit of Q′
in MT is at least that of any other bundle that contains item j and T . In particular, the profit is
at least that of Q. This gives us that the profit of R2 in MT is at least that of Q, which finishes
the proof of the lemma.
To finish the proof, we describe how T is determined. The idea is to embed into v1 some problem
that can only be solved by making exponentially many demand queries. The solution to this hard
problem is T . This will give us that reconstructing the menu requires exp(m) demand queries. The
crux is that verifying whether a specific bundle T is a solution to the hard problem can be done
with only one query. Thus, pricedem(A) can be computed with one demand query (to compute
MT (S), we check whether S solves the hard problem) and we can find a profit maximizing bundle
by making only poly(m) demand queries.
Our hard problem will be finding a value maximizing bundle of size m2 . Fix some ǫ > 0. We
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will assume that there exists some bundle T for which player 1’s valuation is:
vT1 (S) =


0 |S| < m2 ,
0 |S| = m2 , S 6= T
1
4 S = T,
1 |S| > m2 .
Notice that it is easy to check whether S is a value-maximizing bundle: use one value query7 and get
v1(S). S maximizes the value if and only if v1(S) =
1
4 . This give us the following implementation
of the price computing procedure for A: given bundle S, return |S|+ 12 if v1(S) = 14 . Else, return
|S|. All that is left to prove is that finding T requires exponentially many demand queries to v1.
The proof is in fact a special case of a proof that was given in [4] and we bring the proof of the
special case here for completeness.
Lemma B.11 Finding T requires exp(m) demand queries.
Proof: We say that a demand query p = (p1, . . . , pm) covers T , |T | = m2 , if T is the answer to
the demand query p when the valuation of player 1 is vT1 . Notice that if Tp is the set of bundles
that a demand query p covers, we can replace every demand query by querying the value of each
bundle S ∈ Tp. This is true since answer of the demand query can either by some bundle Tp, or
some bundle of size different than m2 . However, the value of every bundle with size different than
m
2 is fixed, a profit-maximizing bundle among those can be easily computed with no queries.
We show that finding a profit maximizing bundle using value queries only requires exp(m)
value queries. The proof will be concluded by showing that every demand query covers at most
one bundle, which implies by our discussion above that every demand query can be simulated by
one value query. Thus, for a constant ǫ > 0, exp(m) demand queries are needed to find T , which
finishes the proof of Theorem B.9.
Claim B.12 Finding T using value queries only requires
(m
m
2
)− 1 value queries.
Proof: Fix some algorithm that finds T and uses only value queries. For every one of the first(
m
m
2
) − 2 queries to bundles of size m2 return 0. T can be either one of the two bundles that were
not queried so far, and an extra value query is needed to decide which one of them is T .
Claim B.13 Every demand query p = (p1, . . . , pm) covers at most one bundle.
Proof: We first claim that if T is covered by p, then for every j /∈ T it must hold that
pj <
3
4 . Otherwise, the bundle T ∪ {j} has a strictly higher profit: vT1 (T ∪ {j}) − Σj′∈T∪{j}pj′ =
1 − Σj′∈T pj′ − pj > 14 − Σj′∈T pj′ = vT1 (T ) − Σj′∈T pj′ . This implies that T is not covered by p, a
contradiction.
Next, observe that if T is covered by p, then there is no item j ∈ T with pj > 14 , otherwise the
profit of T is negative.
Together, this gives us that the only bundle that might be covered by p is the bundle that
contains all items with price at most 14 .
We thus get that finding T requires exponentially many demand queries.
This concludes the proof of Theorem B.9.
7Alternatively, use the demand query that sets pj = 0 for every j ∈ S and pj =∞ otherwise.
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Remark B.14 Notice that in the proof the valuation of player 2 could be general, but player 1 that
is presenting the menu could not have a general valuation. This is because we needed to have exactly
one solution to the “hard problem”. If the valuation of player 1 was allowed to be general, we could
have ended up with multiple bundles of size m2 with value
1
4 , and finding a profit maximizing bundle
could no longer be done with polynomially many demand queries.
In fact, to allow player 1 to have general valuation, we need to have some problem that needs
exponentially many demand queries to solve, and every instance has at most one unique solution
or, equivalently, instances with more than one unique solution can be solved with poly(m) demand
queries (the equivalent of unique-SAT [38]). Currently, we do not know whether such a problem
exists. We do note however that we can use cryptographic constructs to get a similar (somewhat
weaker) result for general valuations. For example, given a one way permutation π, we could use
a very similar construction to the one in the proof, except that we let v1(S) =
1
4 if and only if
π(S) = 0 (where we slightly abuse notation here by using the binary representation of S). Thus,
there is only one bundle S with v1(S) =
1
4 , and constructing the menu is equivalent to inverting the
one way permutation π, even if computing demand queries takes O(1) time.
B.2.2 The Affinity of Mechanisms
We now characterize the structure of the menu in mechanisms that use only demand queries.
Definition B.15 A menu M is called α-min-affine if there exists a set of α price vectors {pi}i
with each pij ∈ R+ ∪ {0} ∪ {∞} and a set of numbers {ri}i such that for every bundle S with
M(S) <∞ we have that M(S) = mini{Σj∈Spij + ri}.
A menu M is (α, β)-almost min-affine if it is min-affine with complexity α except for β many
bundles (which may have arbitrary prices, including ∞). Notice that an (α, β)-almost min-affine
menu can obviously be described by α price vectors in addition to β numbers. When β = 0, we
say that the affinity of A, denoted aff(A), is α.
Theorem B.16 Let A be a mechanism that is truthful for general valuations and uses only demand
and value queries. If A makes at most α demand queries and β value queries then every menu
presented in A is (α, β)-almost min-affine.
Proof: Fix some menu M that may be presented to player i. Let (vM1 , . . . , vMi−1, vMi+1, . . . , vMn )
be some valuation profile that presents the menu M to player i. Let vi be the valuations where
for each bundle S with M(S) < ∞ we have that vi(S) =M(S). Set the value of bundles S with
M(S) =∞ to v(S) = (m+1)B (recall that B is an upper bound on the highest finite price in the
menu – see Section A).
Consider the oracle calls that A makes to the valuation vi in the instance (v
M
−i , vi): at most
α demand queries and β value queries. Let the price vector of the k’th demand query be pk and
let Dk be the bundle returned by this demand query. Let rk = vi(D
k) − Σj∈Dkpkj . Let the set of
bundles queried by the value queries be T = {T 1, . . . , T β}.
For each price vector pk, obtain a price vector p′k by replacing every pkj such that p
k
j > B with
pkj = ∞. In addition, if for some k we have that rk > B then we set pkj = ∞ for all j. Let M′
be the (α, β)-almost min-affine menu defined by the price vectors {p′k}k and the numbers {rk}k,
except that we set the price of every bundle T r ∈ T to be M′(T r) =M(T r).
The theorem is obtained by showing that M and M′ are equal:
Lemma B.17 For every k and every bundle S /∈ T withM(S) <∞ we have thatM(S) = vi(S) ≤
Σj∈Sp
k
j + r
k.
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Proof: Suppose towards a contradiction that for some k,M(S) = vi(S) > Σj∈Spkj + rk. We then
have that:
vi(S)− Σj∈Spkj > rk = vi(Dk)−Σj∈Dkpkj
In contradiction to our assumption that Dk is a profit-maximizing bundle when the price vector is
pk.
Lemma B.18 For every bundle S /∈ T with M(S) < ∞ there exists some k such that M(S) =
vi(S) = Σj∈Sp
k
j + r
k.
Proof: We say that bundle S is tight if M(S) <∞ and for some L 6= ∅, vi(S + L) = vi(S). We
start with proving the lemma for bundles that are not tight. Fix a bundle S that is not tight, and
let v′i,ǫ be the valuation that is identical to v except that vi,ǫ(S) = vi(S)+ ǫ, for some small enough
ǫ > 0 (so that vi,ǫ is still monotone). Since for every bundle S
′ with M(S′) < ∞ we have that
vi(S
′) =M(S′), when the valuation of player i is vi, his profit is 0, regardless of the bundle that is
eventually allocated to him. Now observe that when the valuation of player i is vi,ǫ, S is the only
bundle with a strictly positive profit is S. Thus, the mechanism must allocate S to player i when
his valuation is vi,ǫ.
If the mechanism does not allocate S to player i when the valuation is vi, the mechanism must
distinguish between the case when the valuation is vi and the case when the valuation is vi,ǫ (for
every small enough ǫ > 0). Since the mechanism makes only two types of queries, this is possible
only if when the valuation is vi,ǫ we have that S ∈ T or if there exists some k such that the k’th
demand query returns a bundle that is different than Dk. Since by assumption S /∈ T we assume
the latter case. For every small enough ǫ > 0, let kǫ be the first demand query that changes
(comparing to the sequence with the valuation vi). Since the number of demand queries α is finite,
when we take ǫ to 0 there must be some k such that for every δ > 0 there exists some ǫ < δ such
that the k’th demand query is the first to change when the valuation of player i is vi,ǫ. I.e., for
arbitrarily small ǫ > 0 we have that vi(S) + ǫ > Σj∈Sp
k
j + r
k, and therefore we also have that
vi(S) ≥ Σj∈Spkj + rk. Applying Lemma B.17 we get that vi(S) = Σj∈Spkj + rk, as needed.
We are left with proving the lemma for tight bundles. Fix a tight bundle S, and let L, L∩S = ∅,
be a maximal set for which vi(S + L) = vi(S). If S ∈ {Dk}k, then it immediately holds that for
some k, vi(S) = Σj∈Sp
k
j + r
k. If S /∈ {Dk}k, we observe that S + L is not tight (if it is tight
then there exists L ⊆ L′ such that vi(S) = vi(S + L′), contradicting the maximality of L) and
thus there is some k for which vi(S + L) = Σj∈S+Lp
k
j + r
k. Since vi(S + L) = vi(L), it must be
that Σj∈Lp
k
j = 0, as otherwise vi(S) − Σj∈Spj > rk. Thus S has to be the result of this query. In
particular, vi(S) = vi(S + L) = Σj∈S+Lp
k
j + r
k = Σj∈Sp
k
j + r
k, which completes the proof.
Lemma B.19 For every bundle S /∈ T we have that M(S) = ∞ if and only if for every k,
Σj∈Sp
k
j + r
k > (m+ 1) · B.
Proof: Consider a bundle S /∈ T with M(S) = ∞. If S is not profitable in the k’th demand
query, then by definition Σj∈Sp
k
j ≥ v(S) and the lemma follows. If S is profitable we know that:
rk = vi(T
k)− Σj∈T kpkj ≥ vi(S)− Σj∈Spkj = (m+ 1)B − Σj∈Spkj
Rearranging, we get that in this case Σj∈Sp
k
j + r
k > (m+ 1)B.
Thus, the proof of Theorem B.16 can be concluded as follows: if S ∈ T , we trivially have that
M(S) =M′(S). For every bundle S /∈ T with M(S) <∞, Lemma B.18 gives us that there exists
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some k for which vi(S) =M(S) = Σj∈Spkj + rk. In particular, since M(S) ≤ B, for this k it must
hold for every j ∈ S that pkj ≤ B. Thus, we have that Σj∈Spkj = Σj∈Sp′kj and also that rk ≤ B.
By Lemma B.17 the price of the bundle cannot be higher, which gives us that M(S) =M′(S) for
every S /∈ T .
Now for bundles S /∈ T withM(S) =∞. By Lemma B.19, for every k it holds that Σj∈Spkj+rk >
(m+ 1) · B. Since |S| ≤ m, the LHS consists of at most m+ 1 non-negative summands, thus one
of them is greater than B. We will show that for at least one j ∈ S, p′kj =∞. Hence, M′(S) =∞,
as needed. If we have some j ∈ S such that pkj > B, then p′kj = ∞. The only other option is that
rk > B. In this case, for all j it is true that p′kj =∞, which concludes the proof.
The characterization gives us some hope of finally proving some bounds on the power of com-
putationally efficient mechanisms that use only demand queries to access the valuations. When
restricting ourselves to deterministic mechanisms, a ratio of O(
√
m) is the best known [14]. When
randomization is allowed, a significantly better approximation ratio of O(
√
logm) is possible [10].
Open Question 3 Consider mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with m items that make only
demand queries and are truthful for submodular valuations.
• Is there a deterministic mechanism with aff(A) = poly(m,n) that obtains an approximation
ratio of m
1
2
−ǫ, for some constant ǫ > 0?
• Is there a randomized universally truthful mechanism with aff(A) = poly(m,n) that obtains
an approximation ratio of (logm)
1
2
−ǫ, for some constant ǫ > 0?
Interestingly, the O(
√
logm) approximation ratio of [10] is obtained by a mechanism with
aff(A) = 1. Thus, even the following easier question is of interest:
Open Question 4 Let A be a randomized universally truthful mechanism for combinatorial auc-
tions with m that is truthful for submodular valuations. Suppose that aff(A) = 1. Can the
approximation ratio of A be (logm)
1
2
−ǫ, for some constant ǫ > 0?
Tightness. To see that the Theorem B.16 is essentially tight (i.e., there is a mechanism with an
(α, β)-min affine menu that makes approximately α demand queries and β value queries), consider
the following truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two players, Alice and Bob. We
first show this for some α > 0 and β = 1, and will sketch how to generalize for any β later. Fix
some set of M ′ items, |M ′| = m2 .
Let MBob = {M1, . . . ,M2c} be a set of 2c menus, where each Mi ∈MBob is (α, 0)-min affine.
We require in addition that for every t and item j /∈ M ′, Mt(T ) = ∞, for every T that contains
item j. Bob then chooses a profit maximizing bundle according to the menu Mt (breaking ties in
some consistent way), and pays appropriately. Alice never receives any items. We claim that it is
possible to find a profit-maximizing bundle by making α demand queries:
Claim B.20 Let M be some menu (α, 0) that is presented to player i with valuation vi. Then, a
profit maximizing bundle according to M can be found by making α demand queries.
Proof: Let {pi}i be the price vectors and {ri}i be the numbers that define the min affine menu.
We will find a profit maximizing bundle by making α demand queries, one for each pi. Let Dk be
the bundle returned by the k’th demand query. We claim that the maximum profit is obtained by
a bundle Dk ∈ argmaxk′ vi(Dk′)− (Σj∈Dk′pk
′
j + r
k′). If this maximum profit is non-negative, then
the profit maximizing bundle is the empty set.
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In order to prove this, suppose that some other bundle T maximizes the profit. Let k′ ∈
argmink(Σj∈T p
k
j +r
k). But then, vi(D
k′)−M(Dk) = vi(Dk′)−Σj∈Dk′pk
′
j −rk
′ ≥ vi(T )−Σj∈T pk′j −
rk
′
= vi(T ) −M(T ) (where in the inequality we use vi(Dk′) − Σj∈Dk′pk
′
j ≥ vi(T ) − Σj∈Tpk
′
j , since
Dk maximizes the profit in the k′ demand query), i.e., Dk
′
is at least as profitable as T .
The mechanism is clearly truthful. It uses one value query and α demand queries (by the claim).
All menus that are presented are (α, 1)-min affine.
Finally, to extend this result to min-affine menus with β > 1, embed a construction similar to
the tightness example of Subsection B.1 using only items that are not in M ′.
B.3 Non-Interactive Menu Optimization
Here we study the complexity of non-interactive menu optimization. Consider the following two
player menu optimization problem: Alice’s input is some menu M ∈ U , where the set of menus U
is known in advance. Bob’s input is some valuation v. The goal is to find a bundle that maximizes
the profit v(S) −M(S). We restrict ourselves to one way protocols: Alice speaks first and then
Bob. After Bob speaks, both parties know a profit maximizing bundle S.
We consider this problem in three different models that differ on how Bob’s valuation is accessed.
In the general communication model Bob’s message is not restricted in any way, as long as his
message depends only on Alice’s message and v. We then consider settings in which Bob’s valuation
can be accessed by one specific type of queries, either value or demand. That is, after Alice speaks
the center makes a (possibly adaptive) sequence of queries to v that is determined only by Alice’s
message. After the sequence of queries ends, the players know Bob’s profit-maximizing bundle.
Let U be the set of menus presented to some player in a truthful mechanism A. As we will
see, the communication complexity of this problem in the general model is essentially tax(A), in
the value queries model val(A), and aff(A) in the demand queries model. That is, these measures
capture the complexity of non-interactive menu optimization.
Lemma B.21 In the general model, the communication complexity of the menu optimization prob-
lem is between tax(A) and tax(A) +m.
Proof: To see that the communication complexity is at most tax(A) +m, consider the following
protocol: Alice uses tax(A) bits to send the index of the menu that she holds, Bob then uses m
bits to announce a profit maximizing bundle.
Suppose that there is a protocol with communication complexity strictly less than tax(A).
Then, there are two menus M,M′, M 6= M′ for which Alice sends the same message. Since
the two menus are different, there is some bundle S such that M(S) 6= M′(S). Without loss
of generality assume that M(S) 6= M′(S). Suppose that Bob’s valuation v is a single minded
valuation: v(S) = M(S)+M
′(S)
2 , every bundle T that contains S equals v(S), and every other
bundle equals 0. Since Bob cannot distinguish between M and M′, the bundle T returned by the
protocol is identical given that Bob’s valuation is v. However, if the menu is M then any profit
maximizing bundle does not contain S, but if the menu isM′ every profit maximizing bundle must
contain S. A contradiction.
Lemma B.22 In the value queries model, the communication complexity of the menu optimization
problem is between mc(A) · k and mc(A) ·m · k +mc(A) · k, where k is the number of bits that are
used to represent prices in A.
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Proof: To see that the communication complexity is at most mc(A) · k, consider the following
protocol: for each of the mc(A) bundles that in M, Alice uses m bits to send the identity of each
bundle that is in M and additional k bits to send its price. Then, the center makes a value query
to determine the value of every bundle that appeared in Alice’s message.
The fact that the communication complexity is at least mc(A) · k follows from Theorem B.2
that essentially shows that the center needs to query every bundle in the menu in order to find a
profit maximizing bundle.
Lemma B.23 In the demand queries model, the communication complexity of the menu optimiza-
tion problem is between aff(A) · k and aff(A) · (m+ 1) · k, where k is the number of bits that are
used to represent prices in A.
Proof: To see that the communication complexity is at most aff(A) · k, consider the following
protocol: for each of the aff(A) price vectors that define the min-affine menu, Alice sends the
m+ 1 numbers that describe it. The center then makes the appropriate demand queries to find a
profit-maximizing bundle as in Claim B.20.
If the center can make r demand queries on every menu to find a profit-maximizing bundle of
v, then by Theorem B.16 the affinity of every menu is at most r, and thus aff(A) ≤ r, as needed.
C Applications and Extensions
C.1 From Ex-Post Nash to Dominant Strategy
The revelation principle implies that if there is a mechanism that implements some social choice
function in an ex-post Nash equilibrium, there is also a mechanism that implements the same social
choice function in a dominant strategy equilibrium. Unfortunately, the communication complexity
of the latter mechanism might be exponential comparing to the communication complexity of the
former (e.g., the already mentioned example of the VCG mechanism for gross substitutes). We
provide a more efficient transformation.
Proposition C.1 Let A be a two player mechanism for combinatorial auctions that reaches an
ex-post Nash equilibrium. Then, there is a mechanism A′ that implements the same social choice
function in dominant strategies with communication complexity 2(tax(A)+m)+tie(A) ≤ 2(tax(A)+
m)+cc(A). In particular, if A is truthful for general valuations, then the communication complexity
of the new implementation is 3cc(A) + 2m.
In particular, for general valuations we pay “almost nothing” (communication-wise) for strengthen-
ing the solution concept (simply using the fact that for general valuations by Theorem 2.3 we have
that tax(A) ≤ cc(A)). Similar transformations are possible of course for other classes of valuations
using Theorem 2.3. Before formally proving for Proposition C.1 we provide some intuition. A naive
proof for this proposition would be the following protocol:
1. Each player i simultaneously sends tax(A) bits that denote the index of Mi – the menu he
presents to the other player.
2. Each player i sends a description of some maximum profit bundle Ti in the menu presented
to him (m bits for each player). Denote the price of Ti in the menu by pi.
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3. Each player i is assigned Ti and pays pi.
This protocol “almost works” except that it is not clear how each player i chooses which maximum-
profit bundle to report if there are several bundles that maximize the profit. To solve this we have
to be able to break ties correctly, and make sure that each player has a dominant strategy.
Proof: (of Proposition C.1) We start with some definitions. Let P be some protocol. Given
strategies strategies s1(·), . . . , sn(·), we say that a (possibly partial) transcript T of P is consistent
with a valuation profile (v1, . . . , vn) if the transcript is T when each player i is playing si(vi).
Consider a transcript T of P that is not consistent with any valuation profile (v1, . . . , vn). Let T
′
be the minimal prefix of T that is not consistent and let i be the player that sent the last bit in T ′.
Player i is the inconsistent player of T ′.
For each player i, let si denote the equilibrium strategy of each player i in A. The mechanism
A′ is the following:
1. Each player i simultaneously sends tax(A) bits that denote the index of Mi – the menu he
presents to the other player in si(vi).
2. Each player i sends a description of some maximum profit bundle Ti according to the menu
presented to him by the other player (m bits for each player). Denote the price of Ti in the
menu by pi.
3. Run the mechanism A.
4. For each player i let s′i(vi) be the strategy where in the first step player i sends the index of
Mi and in Step 3 player i plays as in si(vi).
5. If there exist valuations v1, v2 such that the transcript is consistent with s
′
1(v1) and s
′
2(v2)
then the outcome of A′ is identical to that of A. Otherwise, let i be the inconsistent player.
In this case, player i is not allocated any bundle and pays nothing. The other player wins
the bundle Ti and pays pi.
Observe that if each player i with valuation vi plays s
′
i(vi) then the outcome of A
′ is identical
to the outcome of A when each player i plays si(vi). The statement of the proposition regarding
the communication complexity of A′ is obvious as well. It remains to show that s′i is a dominant
strategy. We start with two helper claims.
Claim C.2 If player i’s strategy is s′i(vi), for some vi, then player i is not an inconsistent player.
Proof: Assume that i = 1, but the proof is essentially the same for i = 2. Let q2 be the strategy
of player 2. Consider a run of A′. If player 2 is an inconsistent player then there is nothing to
prove. Therefore, we will consider the messages sent by player 1 one by one, in each point assuming
that the transcript so far is consistent with some strategies (s′1(v1), s
′
2(v2)). Now consider player 1
sending his next message according to s′1(v1). Notice that this message is identical to the message
that is sent at this point in the transcript where the players use strategies s′1(v1) and s
′
2(v2). In
particular the next message according to s′1(v1) that player 1 sends does not make him inconsistent
since the partial transcript is identical to the prefix of the final transcript when both players are
playing according to s′1(v1) and s
′
2(v2).
Claim C.3 If player i with valuation vi uses the strategy s
′
i(vi) then his profit is vi(Ti)− pi.
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Proof: As before, assume that i = 1, the proof is essentially the same for i = 2. First, by
Claim C.2 player 1 is not an inconsistent player. If player 2 is the inconsistent player, then by the
definition of the protocol player 1 is assigned T1 and pays p1 so his profit his v1(T1)−p1, as needed.
We therefore assume that the strategies that the players play are consistent with some strategies
(s′1(v1), s
′
2(v2)). Denote the bundle that player 1 got by T
′
1 and his payment by p
′
1. Now recall
that the outcome of A′ with these strategies is identical to the outcome of A with the strategies
(s1(v1), s2(v2)) and that since these strategies form an ex-post Nash equilibrium in A, it must be
that T ′1 is a maximum-profit bundle according to the menu M2. However, T1 is also a maximum
profit bundle according to M2 and thus v1(T ′1)− p′1 = v1(T1)− p1, which finishes the proof.
To conclude the proof it suffices to show that:
Claim C.4 For every player i with valuation vi, s
′
i(vi) is a dominant strategy in A
′.
Proof: We prove the claim for i = 1, the claim for i = 2 is essentially the same. Fix a strategy qi
for every player i. If player 2 is inconsistent then by claim C.3 the profit of player 1 is v1(T1)− p1.
If player 1 plays a different strategy that makes player 2 consistent, the menu M2 must still be
consistent with the menu presented to him in the first step, otherwise player 2 is inconsistent. Since
T1 maximizes the profit, the profit of player 1 is at most v1(T1)− p1.
Let S1 be the bundle that player 1 is allocated at the end of A
′. Let M2 be the menu that
player 1 is presented with at the first step of the protocol. We will show that the payment of player
1 is M2(S1) – the price of S1 in M2. Claim C.3 gives us that player 1 is not worse off playing
s′1(v1) in this case. If player 1 is inconsistent then his profit is 0 and, again, he is not worse off
playing s′1(v1), which completes the proof.
We now show that if player 1 is consistent then the payment of player 1 is M2(S1). This is
obvious if player 2 is inconsistent. Else, the strategies are consistent with some (s′1(v
′
1), s
′
2(v
′
2)).
Since player 2 is consistent, we in particular have that when player 2 uses the strategy s2(v
′
2) he
presents to player 2 the menu M2 and player 1 chooses a profit-maximizing bundle from that
menu. Since the outcome of A with strategies (s1(v
′
1), s2(v
′
2)) is identical to the outcome of A
′ with
strategies (s′1(v
′
1), s
′
2(v
′
2)) we have that the price of S1 in A
′ is determined according to M2.
This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Open Question 5 Is there a social choice function f (for three players or more) for combinatorial
auctions with general valuations such that:
• There exists a protocol with communication complexity poly(m) that implements f in ex-post
Nash equilibrium.
• Any dominant-strategy implementation of f requires exp(m) bits.
C.2 Taxation, Welfare Maximization, and Simultaneous Algorithms
We now explore the connections between truthful mechanisms and simultaneous algorithms [13]. We
first show that if there is a two-player truthful mechanism that provides an approximation ratio of α,
then there is an α-approximation simultaneous algorithm with essentially the same communication
complexity. Thus, in order to prove a separation between the power of computationally efficient
truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization and their non-truthful counterparts it is enough to
bound the power of simultaneous algorithms for two players.
We start with solving a special case. Let A be a mechanism that is truthful for a class V of
valuations. We say that A is precise if for every player i, every menu M that may be presented to
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player i and every v ∈ V, there is always only a single bundle that maximizes the profit of i, i.e.,
for every v ∈ V: | argmaxS v(S)−M(S)| = 1.
Claim C.5 Let A be a precise two-player mechanism that is truthful for some class of valuations
V. Denote its approximation ratio to the welfare by α. Then, there is a simultaneous algorithm A′
that provides an α-approximation for V with communication complexity 2 · tax(A).
Proof: For every menu M presented to player 1 by player 2 and menu M′ presented by player
1 to player 2, let SM,M
′
be the union of the bundles that player 1 might receive when the menus
presented are M and M′. I.e., if we let VM′ ⊆ V be the subset of valuations in V such that player
i presents the menu M′:
SM,M
′
= ∪v∈VM′ argmaxS v(S) −M(S)
The simultaneous algorithm A′ can now be defined as follows. Each player i simultaneously sends
tax(A) bits that represent the index of the menu that player i is presenting to the other player in
A. Let M and M′ be those menus. The output of the algorithm A′ is (SM,M′ ,M − SM,M′).
Consider some instance (v, v′). Denote the allocation of A in that instance by (S1, S2) and
that of A′ by (S′1, S
′
2). We will show that S1 ⊆ S′1 and that S2 ⊆ S′2 and the claim regarding the
approximation ratio immediately follows by using the monotonicity of the valuations.
We first observe that S1 ⊆ S′1. This is true since argmaxS v(S) −M(S) ⊆ SM,M
′
= S′1 by
definition. To show that S2 ⊆ S′2 we will show that S2 ∩ SM,M
′
= ∅. Else, there exists some
v ∈ VM′ such that for the (unique) profit maximizing bundle S in M we have S ∩ S2 6= ∅. Now
observe in the instance (v, v′) A allocates the bundle S to v and the bundle S2 to v
′, since by
preciseness they are both the uniquely profit-maximizing bundles. However, this is not a valid
allocation since S ∩ S2 6= ∅.
Not every mechanism is precise since there might be several bundles that maximize the profit.
However, since the profit from a bundle is defined by a linear inequality, adding independent
“random noise” to the value of each bundle results with high probability with a unique bundle
that maximizes the profit in every menu. Therefore, we will show that for every valuation v there
is a valuation v′ that is “almost the same” such that if we look at A with respect to all possible
valuations v′ we get that A is precise and the result follows. One technicality that arises is that we
need to make sure that the precision of representing numbers in A is big enough so that the noise
we add is small enough and the profit maximizing bundle is unique.
Definition C.6 Valuation v ǫ-approximates a valuation v′ if for every bundle S it holds that
|v(S)− v′(S)| ≤ ǫ. A class of valuations V ǫ-approximates a class of valuations V ′ ⊆ V if for every
v ∈ V there is some v′ ∈ V ′ that ǫ-approximates it.
We prove the next proposition for the case that V is the class of general (monotone) valuations.
The extension to the other classes we discuss in this paper should be clear.
Proposition C.7 Fix some ǫ > 0. Let A be a two-player mechanism that is truthful for general
valuations. Suppose that numbers are represented in A (in the sense of Section A.4.1) so that in
an interval of ǫ2 there are l distinct numbers, l > 2
2m+tax(A). Then, there is a class of valuations
V ′ that ǫ-approximates the class of general valuations such that A is precise with respect to V ′.
Proof: Given a valuation v, we first make sure that for every S ⊆ S′ we have that v(S′) ≥
v(S) + ǫ2m . This can easily be done by increasing the value of every bundle S by
|S|
2m · ǫ.
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Our next step is to construct at random a new valuation v′ by setting for each bundle S,
v′(S) = v(S) + rS, where rS is one of the l numbers between 0 and
ǫ
2m , selected uniformly at
random and independently for each rS . Notice that v
′ is still a monotone valuation and that it
ǫ-approximates v.
We now compute the probability that v′ has a unique profit-maximizing bundle in some menu
M. Consider two bundles S and S′. The probability that v(S)−M(S)+ rS = v(S′)−M(S′)+ rS′
is at most 1l because of the size of the set that the rS’s are selected from. Using the union bound
and going over all 22m pairs, we get that with probability at most 2
2m
l no two bundles have the
same profit inM. Using the union bound again, the probability that there is a unique bundle that
maximizes the profit in every menu that may be presented is at most 2
2m+tax(A)
l < 1. Thus there
is a v′ that ǫ-approximates v and furthermore, for every menu that is presented to v′ there is a
unique bundle that maximizes the profit. Finally, the class V ′ can now be defined as the set of all
v′ generated from v ∈ V as above.
Corollary C.8 Let A be a two-player mechanism that is truthful for general valuations. Suppose
that numbers are represented in A (in the sense of Section A.4.1) so that in an interval of ǫ2
there are at least l = 22m+tax(A) distinct numbers. Denote the approximation ratio to the welfare
by α. Then, there is a simultaneous algorithm A′ with communication complexity 2tax(A), that
outputs for every instance an allocation with welfare OPTα − ǫ, where OPT is the value of a welfare
maximizing allocation in the instance.
Before proving the corollary, two comments on its limitations are in place. We first discuss the
required precision l. The number of bits needed to represent l numbers is log l, and thus we require
that numbers will be represented by poly(m, tax(A)) bits. In particular, for the domains handled
in Theorem 2.3 and for mechanisms with polynomial communication (which are the domains and
mechanisms for which this approach of proving impossibility is of interest), we get that we need
poly(m) bits to represent numbers, as common and expected.
Second, the approximation guarantee suffers from an additive loss of ǫ. This almost does
not affect the approximation ratio if the valuations are large enough. Moreover, essentially all
reasonable valuation classes are “scalable” in the sense that any valuation is still in the class when
multiplying all values by the same constant. Therefore, if the original valuation of a player is “too
small” he can simply play as if his valuation is his real valuation times a large enough scale factor,
in addition to sending the scale factor. If one of the valuations does not need scaling, then the
smaller valuation can be ignored for the purpose of analyzing the approximation ratio. If both
valuations need scaling to essentially the same factor, the algorithm mimics the allocation of the
scaled up valuations, and the (multiplicative) approximation ratio is preserved with respect to the
actual valuations.
Proof: (of Corollary C.8) The simultaneous algorithm is the following: each player i maps his
valuation to some valuation that ǫ-approximates it in the set V ′ guaranteed by Proposition C.7.
Then the players run the algorithm of Claim C.5 with respect to their mapped valuations. The
approximation ratio follows since the mapped valuations are an ǫ-approximation to the actual
valuations of the players.
Thus, in order to prove the first gap between computationally efficient truthful mechanisms for
combinatorial auctions and their non-truthful counterparts, it is enough to settle on the affirmative
one of the following questions (the best 2-player algorithm for XOS valuations obtains an approxi-
mation ratio of 43 [15] and for submodular valuations the best currently known algorithm obtains
an approximation ratio of 1713 [20]):
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Open Question 6
• Is there a 2-player simultaneous algorithm for combinatorial auctions with XOS valuations
that provides a 43 -approximation with message length poly(m)?
• Is there a 2-player simultaneous algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular valu-
ations that provides a 1713 -approximation with message length poly(m)?
As discussed in the introduction, we can alternatively prove impossibility results by proving
lower bounds on the taxation complexity, e.g., for combinatorial auctions with n subadditive players:
Open Question 7
• Let A be a truthful deterministic mechanism for combinatorial auctions with n subadditive
players that obtains an approximation ratio of m
1
2
−ǫ, for some constant ǫ > 0. Is the taxation
complexity of A exponential in n and m?
• Let A be a randomized universally truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with n
XOS players that obtains an approximation ratio of (logm)
1
2
−ǫ, for some constant ǫ > 0.
Is the expected taxation complexity of a truthful deterministic mechanism sampled from the
distribution that defines A exponential in n and m?
C.3 The Taxation Complexity of Truthful in Expectation Mechanisms
We now consider truthful in expectation mechanisms. That is, the mechanism outputs distribu-
tions over allocations. The value of player i for an output distribution D is E[vi(Ai)] where Ai is
the random variable that denotes the bundle that player i gets in D. The definition of a truthful
mechanism is now the same, with respect to these extensions. Similarly, applying the taxation
principle yields that every player is still presented with a menu (the menu now consists of distribu-
tions over allocations but still depends only on the valuations of the other players) and is allocated
a profit-maximizing distribution.
The next proposition shows that there exists a truthful in expectation mechanism A for general
valuations in which tax(A) >> cc(A) (note that by Theorem 2.3) if the mechanism is deterministic
then tax(A) ≤ cc(A)). This might hint why in some cases there exist computationally efficient
truthful in expectation mechanism that achieve approximation ratios very close to what is possible
completely ignoring incentives issues [11, 17], whereas we either suspect or know that these approx-
imation ratios are not achievable by computationally efficient deterministic truthful mechanisms.
Proposition C.9 There is a mechanism A that is truthful in expectation for combinatorial auc-
tions with general valuations with cc(A) = poly(m) and tax(A) = Ω(exp(cc(A)).
Proof: Lavi and Swamy [28] present a truthful in expectation mechanism that provides an
approximation ratio of O(
√
m). The communication complexity of the mechanism is poly(m,n).
The starting point of their algorithm is the following linear relaxation for maximizing welfare in
combinatorial auction:
Maximize: Σi,Sxi,Svi(S)
Subject to:
• For each item j: Σi,S|j∈Sxi,S ≤ 1
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• for each player i: ΣSxi,S ≤ 1
• for each i, S: xi,S ≥ 0
The algorithm is maximal in distributional range8. In particular, for every set of valuations
v1, . . . , vn where the variables of the optimal fractional solution are {xi,S}i,S the mechanism outputs
the allocation (St1, . . . , S
t
n) with probability p
t such that Σtp
t · Σivi(Sti ) = Σi,Sxi,Svi(S)α for α =
Θ(
√
m).
We now give a lower bound on the taxation complexity of that mechanism. We restrict our
attention to two players, and show the menu of any two different strictly monotone valuations v, v′
of the first player induce a different menu. The proposition will then follow since the number of
different strictly monotone valuations is at least doubly exponential9.
We say that the price of S in the menu presented to player 2 is the price of the distribution
that allocates S to player 2 with probability 1α and the empty set otherwise. We will show that
for every strictly monotone valuation v of the first player the price of S is v(M)−v(M−S)α and the
proposition will follow. To see this, consider the following valuation:
u(T ) =
{
2v(M) S ⊆ T ;
0 otherwise.
The unique optimal fractional solution of the instance (v, u) is x1,M−S = 1 and x2,S = 1. Thus the
mechanism allocates the bundle S to player 2 with probability 1α . Since the algorithm is maximal
in distributional range the payment (according to the VCG payment scheme) is v(M)−v(M−S)α .
D Proof of Theorem 2.3
Theorem 2.3 is proved by a reduction to a new problem that we introduce, the menu verification
problem.
The Menu Verification Problem. The menu verification problem is defined with respect
to some n-player mechanism A which is truthful for some class of valuations V and player i.
Denote by M i = {Mk}k the set of all menus that may be presented to player i in A. Let
B = maxS:M′(S)<∞,M′∈M i M′(S) be the maximum finite price that appear in all menus.
An instance of the menu verification problem is given by (v−i, f). Specifically, the input of each
player i′ 6= i is a valuation vi′ and player i’s input is a monotone function f : 2M → R ∪ {∞}
which is called the base function. We assume that f has the following properties: for every S with
f(S) <∞ it holds that f(S) ≤ B and f(∅) = 0. Notice that we do not assume that f ∈ V.
Let M be the menu presented to player i in the mechanism A when the valuations of the other
players are v−i. The goal in the menu verification problem is to determine whether for some S we
have that f(S) >M(S). If there is such S, the last bit of the protocol should be player i sending
the bit 1, else this last bit has to be 0.
Recall that the taxation complexity of player i is log |M i|. The next lemma connects the taxation
complexity of A to the communication complexity of the menu verification problem:
8An algorithm is maximal in distributional range if there exists a pre-defined range of distributions over allocations
and the algorithm always selects the distribution in that range that maximizes the expected welfare. Truthfulness in
expectation follows by using VCG payments. See [11] for more details.
9This can be seen, for example, by considering the set of strictly monotone valuations v such that v(S) = |S| for
|S| 6= m
2
and v(S) ∈ {m
2
, m
2
− 1} for |S| = m
2
. There are 2
(mm
2
)
such valuations.
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Lemma D.1 Fix a mechanism A that is truthful for some class of valuations V. Fix also some
player i. Suppose that the communication complexity of the menu verification problem (with respect
to V, A and i) is q. Then, the taxation complexity of player i in A is at most q − 1.
Proof: We start with a definition:
Definition D.2 (menu generators) For each menu M ∈M i, we arbitrarily choose exactly one
valuation profile vM−i = (v
M
1 , . . . , v
M
i−1, . . . , v
M
i+1, . . . , v
M
n ) of players (1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n) such
that the menu M is presented to player i. The valuation profile vM−i is the menu generator of M.
Consider some menuM ∈M i. Let vM−i be the valuation profile that is a menu generator ofM.
The canonical instance of a menu M in the menu verification problem is the instance (vM−i ,M),
i.e., the valuations of all players except i are as in vM−i and the base function is the menu M.
Consider a protocol P with communication complexity q for the menu verification problem.
Claim D.3 shows that for eachM,M′ ∈M i,M 6=M′, the transcript of P in the canonical instance
of M differs from the transcript in the canonical instance of M′. Recall that the communication
complexity of P is q, thus the number of transcripts is at most 2q. This already gives us that the
number of canonical instances is at most 2q. We get a bound of 2q on the number of instances, since
the number of canonical instances is exactly |M i|. However, we can do slightly better by observing
that although the length of each transcript is q, but on each canonical instance the transcript ends
with 0. We get that the number of different transcripts is 2q−1, which is also a bound on |M i|.
Claim D.3 For each M,M′ ∈M i, M 6=M′, the transcript of P in the instance (vM−i ,M) differs
from the transcript in the instance (vM
′
−i ,M′).
Proof: Assume towards contradiction that there exist M,M′ ∈ M i, M 6= M′ such that the
transcript of the canonical instance (vM−i ,M) is identical to the transcript of the canonical instance
(vM
′
−i ,M′). Using standard fooling-set arguments (e.g., [26]), this implies that the transcripts
of (vM−i ,M′) and (vM
′
−i ,M) are identical as well. We will show that this is false and reach a
contradiction. Towards this end, observe that the last bit that player i sends in both canonical
instances is by construction 0 (since the function f identifies with the menu presented to player i).
However, we will show that in either (vM−i ,M′) or in (vM
′
−i ,M) the last bit that player i sends is 1.
In particular we get a different transcript, which is a contradiction.
To see that in one of these instances the last bit that is communicated is 1, notice that since
M 6=M′, there must be a bundle S such that M(S) 6=M′(S). Assume without loss of generality
that M(S) >M′(S). Thus in the instance (vM′−i ,M) the last bit that player i communicates is 1
(because f(S) =M(S)).
This finishes the proof of Lemma D.1.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 2.3. For each class of valuations we will
show a protocol P for the menu verification problem with communication complexity equals the
specified taxation complexity, and the theorem will follow by applying Lemma D.1.
On a very high level, we would like to run (the most efficient implementation of) A on the
instance (v−i, f) and decide the menu verification problem by observing the outcome. However,
the main obstacle is that f is in general not a proper valuation function (e.g., some entries might
be ∞) and in particular does not belong to V. The proof overcomes those obstacles in a different
way for each valuation class.
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General valuations. Given a base function f and player i, define this valuation for player i:
vi(S) =
{
f(S) f(S) <∞;
3B otherwise.
Let P be the following protocol: run the most efficient implementation of A on the instance (v−i, vi).
Let Si be the bundle that player i is allocated. M(Si) is therefore the payment of player i. We
add an additional step at the end of the protocol: if vi(Si) >M(Si) then player i sends 1 as the
last bit, otherwise the last bit player 1 sends is 0.
We claim that the last bit of player i is 1 if and only if there is some bundle S such that
f(S) > M(S). We break the proof into two cases, both relying on the simple observation that
since A is truthful by the taxation principle Si ∈ argmaxS vi(S)−M(S).
Claim D.4 Suppose that f(Si) < ∞. Then, f(Si) > M(Si) if and only if for some bundle S,
f(S) >M(S).
Proof: As noted above, Si ∈ argmaxS vi(S) −M(S). When f(Si) < ∞ it holds that f(Si) =
vi(Si) by construction, and thus if vi(Si) >M(Si) then in particular f(Si) >M(Si). If vi(Si) =
f(Si) ≤ M(Si) then, since Si maximizes the profit, for all S such that f(S) < ∞ we have that
f(S) ≤ M(S). As for S with f(S) = ∞, if M(S) = ∞ then f(S) ≤ M(S). To finish the proof
we claim that for all S with f(S) = ∞, it holds that M(S) = ∞. Otherwise, the profit of S is
vi(S)−M(S) ≥ 3B − B = 2B. The profit of Si is vi(Si)−M(Si) ≥ B − 0. Thus, the profit from
the bundle S is strictly larger than the profit from bundle Si, a contradiction.
Claim D.5 Suppose that f(Si) =∞. There is some bundle S for which f(S) >M(S).
Proof: Since Si is the bundle that player i is assigned in A, it must be that M(Si) <∞. Hence
we have that f(Si) >M(Si).
Subadditive valuations. The proof is almost identical to the proof for general valuations. The
only change is that instead of considering the valuation vi we consider the subadditive valuation
v′i(S) = vi(S) + maxT vi(T ) for all S 6= ∅ (for S = ∅ we set v′i(S) = 0 as usual). Player i
sends 1 if and only if v′i(Si) − maxT vi(T ) > M(S). The rest of the proof is identical since the
proof relies only on the difference between pairs of bundles and for every S and S′ (S, S′ 6= ∅):
vi(S)− vi(S′) = v′i(S)− v′i(S′).
XOS valuations. Fix some bundle size r (1 ≤ r ≤ m). We describe a protocol with commu-
nication complexity c + 1 that will determine whether there exists some bundle S, |S| = r, such
that f(S) >M(S). The claim will then follow by observing that there are m possible bundle sizes.
Define an XOS valuation vi that consists of the following additive valuations: for every bundle T
with f(T ) < ∞, |T | = r, let aT be the valuation where aT ({j}) = f(T )r + 3B. If f(T ) = ∞ and
|T | = r, let aT be the valuation where aT ({j}) = 2Br + 3B.
Now, for every one of the possible bundle sizes r, run the most efficient implementation of A on
the instance (v−i, vi). Let Si be the bundle that player i is allocated and M(Si) is the payment of
player i. We add an additional step at the end of A: if |Si| < r then the last bit that player i sends
is 0. Else, if vi(Si)− 3B · r >M(Si) then player i sends 1, otherwise he sends 0. The protocol ends
when player i sends 1 if and only if at the end of at least one step he sent 1. Otherwise, the final
bit is 0.
The bound on the communication complexity for XOS valuations follows from the next lemmas:
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Claim D.6 Let Si be the bundle that player i is assigned in the round where bundles of size r are
considered. If |Si| < r then there is no bundle S, |S| = r with f(S) > M(S). Otherwise, there
exists some S′i (possibly S
′
i = Si) such that |S′i| = r, f(Si) = f(S′i) and vi(Si) = vi(S′i).
Proof: Suppose first that |Si| < r. The profit is vi(Si)−M(Si) = (f(Si)r + 3B) · |Si| −M(Si) ≤
B + (r− 1) · 3B. Suppose that there exists some bundle T such that |T | = r and M(T ) <∞. The
profit from T is at least |T | ·3B−M(T ) ≥ r ·3B−B, where we use the fact that the maximum price
in M is B. Thus the profit from T is strictly larger than the profit Si, which is a contradiction to
the taxation principle, since Si is not a profit-maximizing bundle. Therefore, if |Si| < r then there
is no bundle S, |S| = r with f(S) >M(S), since M(S) =∞ for all S with |S| = r.
Now suppose that |Si| > r. Let T = argmaxT⊆Si,|T |=r vi(T ). Notice that since f is monotone
and since by the taxation principle the profit of Si is at least that of T , we have that vi(T ) ≥ vi(Si).
However, notice that by construction in the maximizing clause of T there are only r non zero
elements, hence it holds that vi(T ) = vi(Si), as needed.
Claim D.7 Let S′i be the bundle guaranteed by Claim D.6. Suppose that f(S
′
i) < ∞. Then,
f(S′i)− 3B · r >M(S′i) if and only if for some bundle S, f(S) >M(S).
Proof: Since Si ∈ argmaxS vi(S) −M(S), by Claim D.6 S′i ∈ argmaxS vi(S) −M(S). When
f(S′i) < ∞ it holds that f(S′i) + 3B = vi(S′i) by construction, and thus if vi(S′i) − 3B > M(S′i)
then in particular f(Si) >M(Si). If vi(S′i) = f(S′i) ≤ M(S′i) then, since S′i maximizes the profit,
for all S such that f(S) <∞ we have that f(S) ≤M(S). As for S with f(S) =∞, if M(S) =∞
then f(S) ≤ M(S). To finish the proof of the claim we show that for all S with f(S) = ∞, we
have that M(S) = ∞. Assume otherwise. The profit of S is vi(S) −M(S) ≥ 5B − B = 4B. The
profit of Si is vi(Si)−M(Si) ≥ 3B − 0. Thus, the profit of S mis strictly bigger than that of Si, a
contradiction to the taxation principle.
Claim D.8 Let S′i be the bundle guaranteed by Claim D.6. Suppose that f(S
′
i) = ∞. There is
some bundle S for which f(S) >M(S).
Proof: Since Si is the bundle that player i is assigned in A, it must be thatM(Si) =M(S′i) <∞.
Hence we have that f(S′i) >M(S′i).
Submodular valuations. We will develop a protocol with communication complexity c+1 that
determines whether there exists some bundle S, |S| = k and f(s) = w such that f(S) > M(S).
The claim will then follow by observing that there arem possible bundle sizes and d possible values.
Let S = {|S| = k and f(s) = w}. Let t = 2m+1 · B. Define the following valuation:
vi(S) =


|S| · t, |S| < k;
k · t, ∃T ∈ S s.t. T ( S;
(k − 1
2|S|
) · t, otherwise.
Claim D.9 vi is non-decreasing and submodular.
Proof: It is easy to verify that vi is non-decreasing. We now show that vi is submodular, i.e.,
marginal values are non-increasing: vi(S∪{j})−vi(S) ≤ vi(T ∪{j})−vi(T ), for every T ( S, j /∈ S.
We divide the analysis into several cases:
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• |T | ≤ k − 2: then we have vi(T ∪ {j}) − vi(T ) = t. We always have vi(S ∪ {j}) − vi(S) ≤ t,
because all marginal values are at most t.
• |T | = k−1: then vi(T ∪{j})−vi(T ) ≥ t2 , since all bundles of size k have value at least (k− 12 )t.
On the other hand, vi(S ∪ {j})− vi(S) ≤ t2 , because by the same token vi(S) ≥ (k − 12)t and
vi(S ∪ {j}) ≤ kt.
• |T | ≥ k and some subset of T (possibly itself) is in S: in this case, it is enough to note
that vi(S) = k · t by the second case of the definition, and so vi(S ∪ {j}) − vi(S) = 0, while
vi(T ∪ {j}) − vi(T ) ≥ 0.
• |T | ≥ k and no subset of T (including itself) is in S: Then vi(T ) = (k− 12|T | )t by the last case
of the definition, and vi(T ∪ {j}) − vi(T ) ≥ t2|T |+1 . On the other hand, vi(S) ≥ (k − 12|S| )t,
which implies that vi(S ∪ {j}) − vi(S) ≤ t2|S| ≤ t2|T |+1 .
Now, for every possible bundle size k and value w, run the most efficient implementation of A
on the instance (v−i, vi). Let Si be the bundle that player i is allocated andM(Si) be the payment
of player i. We add an additional step at the end of A: if vi(Si) = t · k andM(Si) < w then player
i sends 1, otherwise he sends 0. The protocol ends when player i sends 1 if and only if at the end
of at least one step he sent 1. Otherwise, the final bit is 0.
Claim D.10 Let Si be the bundle that player i is assigned in the round where we consider bundle
size k and value w. If there exists a bundle S such that f(S) = w andM(S) <∞, then vi(Si) = t·k.
Proof: Suppose that there exists some bundle S such that f(S) = w andM(S) <∞. The profit
from S is at least vi(S) −M(S) = t · k − B. We now compute the profit of any other bundle T
with vi(T ) < t · k: vi(Si)−M(Si) ≤ vi(Si)− 0 ≤ t · k − t2m = t · k − 2
m+1·B
2m = t · k − 2B. Thus, S
is more profitable than any such T and by the taxation principle T cannot be selected.
Let S = {S|f(S) = w and M(S) < ∞}. If S 6= ∅ then by the claim Si ∈ S and furthermore
by the taxation principle M(Si) ∈ argminS∈SM(S). In particular, if there exists a bundle S ∈ S
with M(S) < w, then M(Si) < w.
If S = ∅, then it immediately holds that for all bundles S with f(S) = w it holds that ∞ =
M(S) > f(S) = w. This finishes the proof of theorem 2.3.
E Proof of Theorem 3.1 – The Menu Reconstruction Theorem
Assume that the player i that we want to construct the menu for is n (the proof is identical
otherwise). Fix the valuations of the other players to be v−n = (v1, . . . , vn−1) and let R be the
menu they present to player n. The idea is to find R by obtaining for every menu M ∈ M i,
M 6= R, a “witness” that proves thatM 6= R. Specifically, a menuM is not alive if we have found
some bundle S such that M(S) 6= R(S).
The basic idea is to have several shrinkage steps, where in each step j we construct a set
Uj ⊆ Uj−1 of menus that are still alive. Let U0 = Mn (where Mn is the set of all menus that
may be presented to player n) and recall that tax(A) ≥ log |Mn|. The goal of each shrinkage step
j is to find a set of live menus Uj such that |Uj | ≤ |Uj−1|2 using only poly(tax(A), price(A)) bits
of communication, obviously making sure that R ∈ Uj . If we are able to accomplish that, we are
guaranteed that after at most tax(A) steps only one menu is alive. This menu must be R.
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E.1 Part 1: Shrinkage Steps
We now describe shrinkage step j. For every bundle S, let pS ∈ argmaxp |{M : M(S) = p,M ∈
Uj−1}| be a most frequent price of S among all menus that are still live. If pS repeats in less than
half of the menus that are in Uj−1, we check the price R(S) (using price(A) bits of communication)
and shrink the set of live menus: keep in Uj only menus M∈ Uj−1 with M(S) = R(S).
The more difficult case is when for every bundle S, pS repeats in at least half of the menus of
Uj−1. The solution to this case relies on a reduction to a problem that we call z-disjointness.
z-Disjointness. The basic setup of the z-disjointness problem is very similar to that of (the
multi-player version of) set disjointness. We have n players, where the input of each player i is
Ai ∈ {0, 1}l . A bit k is disjoint if there exists some player i with Ai = 0, bit k intersects otherwise.
The goal, as in the set-disjointness problem, is to determine whether there is a bit that intersects.
Additionally, we have the following restrictions:
• For each player i the input Ai of player i belongs to some (known) set Si ⊆ {0, 1}l .
• For every possible input in (A1, . . . , An) ∈ S1× . . .×Sn there are at most z bits that intersect.
We will show that:
Theorem E.1 There is protocol with communication complexity O(z2 · n2 · log l) that decides the
z-disjointness problem.
We postpone the proof of Theorem E.1 to Section E.4.
E.2 Part 2: “Decreasing” the Number of Witness Bundles
Our goal is to reduce the problem of determining whether there is a bundle S with R(S) 6= pS (a
witness bundle) to the z-disjointness problem. It will be helpful to “reduce” the number of witness
bundles to z (for a value of z that will be determined later). For a menu M, denote by w(M) the
number of its witness bundles.
Definition E.2 Let Z ′ be a set of menus such that for each M ∈ Z, w(M) ≤ z. Let Z ⊆ Z ′
be a set of menus such with z2 ≤ w(M) ≤ z. We say that a set of bundles P represents Z if the
following conditions simultaneously hold:
1. For every M ∈ Z, there is a bundle S ∈ P such that M(S) 6= pS.
2. For every M ∈ Z ′, w(M) ≤ 8 log |Z ′|.
Lemma E.3 There is a set of bundles P that represents Z.
Proof: We show that if P is constructed by selecting each bundle uniformly at random with
probability 4 log |Z
′|
z then with high probability P represents Z. Fix some menu M ∈ Z. Since M
has at least z2 witnesses, the probability that there is no bundle S ∈ P that is a witness for M is
at most (1− 1
4·log |Z′|
z
)
z
2 ≤ 1
e2 log |Z′|
. Using the union bound, the probability that P does not contain
a witness bundle for some M∈ Z is at most |Z| · 1
e2 log |Z
′|
≤ 1|Z′| .
We now show that the second property is not violated with high probability. Fix some menu
M ∈ Z ′. The number of witness bundles for M is at most z, and thus the expected number of
witnesses forM in P is at most 4 log |Z′|z ·z = 4 log |Z ′|. By the chernoff bounds, the probability that
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the number of witnesses for M that are in P is greater than 8 · log |Z ′| is at most e− 4 log |Z
′|
3 . There
are at most |Z ′| menus. Therefore, by the union bound, the probability that the second property
is violated is at most |Z ′| · e− 4| logZ
′|
3 ≤ e− | logZ
′|
3 .
To conclude, the probability that either of the properties that are necessary for P to represent
Z is violated is at most 1
elog |Z
′| +
1
e
log |Z′|
3
< 1. Thus, there is a set P that represents Z.
We can now describe our high-level approach:
1. Let Z ′ = Uj−1.
2. For each t = 2m, 2m−1, . . . , 4, 2, 1, in decreasing order:
(a) Let Z = {M| t2 ≤ w(M) ≤ t}.
(b) Obtain a set of bundles P that represents Z.
(c) Using P , determine whether R ∈ Z or not by finding a witness. This is done by a
reduction to z-disjointness that will be shortly described.
(d) If a witness for R was found, perform a shrinkage step. Else, let Z ′ = Z ′ − Z and
continue to the next value of t.
The logic is as follows: for each value of t, in descending order, we “guess” that t2 ≤ w(R) ≤ t.
We then construct an instance of z-disjointness that contains an intersecting bit if and only if our
guess was correct. We then solve the z-disjointness instance. If we have found an intersecting bit
then we have found a witness bundle and we can perform a shrinkage step. Otherwise, we remove
from Uj−1 all menus M with t2 ≤ w(M) ≤ t and proceed similarly. If the process ends without
finding a witness bundle, we can conclude that R(S) = pS for every bundle S.
Our reduction to z-disjointness will use z = O(log |Z ′|) = O(tax(A)) and l = 2m+price(A). Thus,
the number of bits needed to solve each instance (by Theorem E.1) is poly(tax(A), price(A),m, n).
We have to solve at most m z-disjointness problems (one for each possible value of t), so the
communication complexity of a shrinkage step is poly(tax(A), price(A),m, n). We now describe
the details of the reduction.
E.3 Part 3: A Reduction to z-Disjointness
We now fill in the details of our high-level approach by describing the reduction to z-disjointness.
The reduction is inspired by the reduction of [1] which shows that disjointness is co-NP complete
(in the communication sense).
Definition E.4 Fix a truthful mechanism A and a protocol Q for computing the price of bundle
S in the menu that is presented to player n. Let price(A) denote the communication complexity of
Q. A communication transcript T is a proof for bundle S and player i < n with valuation vi, if
there exist valuations v′−i of all players 1, . . . , i− 1, i + 1, . . . , n − 1, such that when running Q on
the instance (vi, v
′
−i) the communication transcript is T and the price of S in the menu presented
to player n is not pS.
The reduction takes a set of bundles P and defines a unique “block” that corresponds to each
bundle S ∈ P . The number of bits in a block is 2price(A), where each bit in the block corresponds
to a different possible transcript of A. Therefore, the total length of the input string Ai in the
z-disjointness problem is |P | · 2price(A). We set bit k in player i’s input string that is in the block
that corresponds to a bundle S to 1 if and only if the transcript that corresponds to Aik is a proof
for bundle S and player i. The next claim is the crux of the reduction:
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Claim E.5 Fix some bit k that is in the block that corresponds to bundle S. Then, we have that
A1k = . . . = A
n−1
k = 1 if and only if R(S) 6= pS. Furthermore, in every block there is at most one
bit that intersects.
Proof: Suppose first that A1k = . . . = A
n−1
k = 1. We will show that for every player i, v−i is a
proof for player i and the bundle S, and thus R(S) 6= pS. Towards this end, let vi−i be valuations
that induce a proof for player i and S (notice that by assumption such a proof exists). Notice
that the transcripts of the instances (v1, v
1
−1) and (v2, v
2
−2) are identical by definition. By standard
fooling set arguments (see, e.g., [26]), the transcript of the instance (v1, v2, v
1
3 , . . . , v
1
n−1) is identical
as well. Repeating the same argument by replacing the valuations of players v3, . . . , vn−1 one by
one we get that the transcript of the instance (v1, . . . , vn−1) is the same. We therefore have that
for every player i, v−i is a proof for player i and S, and thus R(S) 6= pS .
In the other direction, if for some player i we have that Aik = 0 then by the reduction there are
no valuations of the other players such that the corresponding transcript is a proof for player i and
S. Therefore, if for every bit k in the block we have some player i with Aik = 0 then R(S) = pS .
To see that every block contains at most one intersecting bit, observe that if bit k in the block S
intersects then the transcript T it corresponds to is the transcript of running Q to compute S when
the valuations of the players are v1, . . . , vn−1. Thus there can be at most one bit that intersects.
Notice that since we use P that represents Z, there are at most 8 log |Z ′| bundles R(S) 6= ps.
By the last claim, this is also a bound on intersecting bits in every possible instance. Thus, we can
apply Theorem E.1 and decide whether there is a bundle S with R(s) 6= pS whenever R ∈ Z.
E.4 Proof of Theorem E.1: Solving z-Disjointness
An efficient protocol for solving z-block disjointness can be obtained as a corollary from the liter-
ature on the communication complexity of problems with a small number of witnesses [24]. For
completeness and since [24] only handles the two-player case we bring the explicit proof here. We
note that this is the only part of the proof of Theorem 3.1 that uses non-standard queries, even if
the original mechanism uses only standard queries.
We start with solving z-disjointness for the special case when z = 1. We will then use this
solution and solve for the case of general z.
Lemma E.6 The communication complexity of solving 1-disjointness is O(n2 · log l).
Proof: We provide a multi-round protocol. In each round s we maintain a set Ks ⊆ Ks+1 of
bits such that for every k ∈ Ks there exists at least one player i with Aik = 0. More specifically,
initially we let K0 = ∅. Then, in each round we either decide the problem by finding a bit k such
that A1k = . . . = A
n
k = 1, or obtain a set Ks by adding to the set Ks−1 at least
l−|Ks−1|
4n additional
bits. We let rs = l − |Ks−1|.
Crucially, if k ∈ Ks then it cannot be the case that A1k = . . . = Ank = 1, thus we can “ignore”
this bit. In other words, we can simply “discard” for each player i and string A ∈ Si every bit k
such that k ∈ Ks (by setting Ak = 0) and effectively obtain a smaller problem with significantly
less bits to consider. We can now proceed to the next round. After O(n · log l) rounds we will
either find a common 1 bit or will be left with only a constant number of bits which may contain
a common 1 bit. In the latter case, all players report the value of all bits that are not in Ks and
determine whether there is a bit that intersects.
Consider some round s. Recall that rs is essentially the number of bits in the instance of 1-
disjointness that we aim to solve in this round. We need some definitions. The neighborhood of the
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k’th bit of player i is Ni(k) = {j|Aj = 1, Ak = 1, A ∈ Si}. If |Ni(k)| > (1− 12n )rs the neighborhood
is large, otherwise it is small.
Next, each player i reports the index of some bit ki with a small neighborhood such that A
i
ki
= 1,
if such exists. This takes n · log l bits of communication. Observe that if there is an intersecting
bit, then it must be in the neighborhood of ki. Suppose that there exists a player i who reported ki
with a small neighborhood (we will shortly handle the case where no such player exists). Observe
that if there is an intersecting bit it must reside in Ni(ki). If Ni(ki) is small then, since Ni(ki) is
known to all players, we can progress to the next step as follows: we obtain Ks by adding to Ks−1
all bits that are not in Ni(ki). Observe that |Ks| ≥ |Ks−1|+ 12n · rs−1.
If none of the players has a bit ki with A
i
ki
= 1 and a small neighborhood, then there is no
intersecting bit:
Claim E.7 Suppose that A1k = . . . = A
n
k = 1 for some bit k. Then there is at least one player i
where Ni(k) is small.
Proof: Let T = ∩ni=1Ni(k). For each i, |Ni(k)| ≥ (1− 12n)rs since it is large. There are n players
and thus | ∩ni=1 Ni(k)| > rs−12 . Let k′ 6= k be some bit in T . We construct an instance with at
least two intersecting bits: by definition of neighborhood for every i there is some Ci ∈ Si where
Cik = C
i
k′ = 1. Thus, in the instance (C
1, C2, . . . , Cn) we have that C1k = C
2
k = . . . = C
n
k = 1 and
C1k′ = C
2
k′ = . . . = C
n
k′ = 1. We got an instance with at least two intersecting bits, contradicting
our promise.
This concludes the proof of Lemma E.6.
The next lemma relates the communication complexity of 1-disjointness to that of z-disjointness.
Lemma E.8 Let fz(l) denote the communication complexity of solving any z-disjointness problem
with n players on l-bit strings. Then, for any z ≥ 2, fz(l) ≤ f1(lz) + fz−1(l). In particular, we get
that fz(l) ≤ z · f1(lz).
Proof: The proof is by induction on z, starting with z = 2. Consider a string Ai of length l.
For an integer z > 1, define the z-product of Ai to be a string s that is constructed as follows: s
consists of
( l
z
)
bits, one for each tuple of z different bits. We set a bit to 1 if and only if all the z
bits that it corresponds to are 1 in Ai.
For each player i, apply a z-product to every Ai ∈ Si. We obtain a new problem. Let
(A1, . . . , An) be some instance of the original problem and (A′1, . . . , A′n) be some instance of the
new problem where for each i, A′i is the z-product of Ai. Observe that (A1, . . . , Ak) contains exactly
z intersecting bits if and only if (A′1, . . . , A′k) contains exactly one intersecting bit. In particular,
if in the original problem the number of intersecting bits is at most z, then after applying the
z-product there is at most one intersecting bit. Since by applying a z-product we get strings of
length at most lz, the communication complexity of the new problem is f1(l
z). We have therefore
established that for every instance (A1, . . . , An) deciding whether the number of intersecting is
exactly z takes at most f1(l
z) bits of communication.
Given an instance (A1, . . . , An) we can run the protocol above. If the protocol finds an in-
tersecting bit, we are of course done. Else, the communication protocol has reached some leaf
which is labeled “no”. Recall that any leaf in the communication protocol corresponds to some sets
S′1, . . . , S′k where each instance (A1, . . . , An) with Ai ∈ S′i generates the same transcript. In par-
ticular, any such instance contains at most z − 1 intersecting bits. Using the induction hypothesis
we can solve this instance using fz−1(l) bits of communication.
Thus, combining Lemmas E.6 and E.8 gives us Theorem E.1.
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F Some Aspects of Theorem 3.3
Here we discuss several aspects of the characterization of the communication complexity of mecha-
nisms that was provided in Theorem 3.3. First, in Subsection F.1 we prove that price(A) ≤ cc(A)
for domains that contain additive valuations. Then, we show the tightness of our characterization
by showing that all terms tax(A), price(A), tie(A) are needed (Subsection F.2).
F.1 Computing the Price of a Bundle
The next proposition shows that if the domain contains additive valuations then price(A) ≤ cc(A).
Proposition F.1 Consider a mechanism A that is truthful for a domain of valuations that contains
additive valuations. Then, price(A) ≤ cc(A).
Proof: Fix some player i and let vi′ be the valuation of every player i
′ 6= i. Denote by M i =
{Mk}k the set of all menus that may be presented to player i in the mechanism A. Let B =
maxS:M′(S)<∞,M′∈M i M′(S) be the maximum finite price that appear in all menus.
Let M be the menu that v−i present to player i. To compute M(S), consider the following
additive valuation vi of player i: vi({j}) = 3B for j ∈ S and vi({j}) = 0 otherwise. Run the most
efficient implementation of A on the instance (vi, v−i) and let Si be the bundle allocated to player
i and p be its payment. We divide the proof into several cases.
If Si = S then obviously the price of S in the menu is p and we are done. If S ⊆ Si then we
observe that since by construction vi(Si) = vi(S) and the menu price of Si is at most that of S (by
the monotonicity of the menu ), it must be that the menu price of Si equals that of S, otherwise
Si does not maximize the profit. Thus the price of S in the menu is p as well.
We will show that in all other cases the price of S in the menu is ∞. If |Si| < |S| then the
profit of Si is at most |Si| · 3B ≤ (|S| − 1) · 3B, whereas had the price of S been finite the profit
were |S| · 3B−B, in contradiction to the taxation principle, since Si is a profit-maximizing bundle.
Thus the price of S in the menu must be infinite in this case.
We have already handled the case where S ⊆ Si, so the only remaining case to consider is when
|Si| ≥ |S| but S is not contained in Si. Then, similarly to before, the profit from Si is at most
(|S| − 1) · 3B whereas the profit from S is at least |S| · 3B − B, which is again a contradiction to
the taxation principle.
If the domain does not contain additive valuations, we do not know the communication com-
plexity of computing the price of player i for a given alternative:
Open Question 8 Let A be a truthful mechanism for an arbitrary domain. Is price(A) ≤ poly(cc(A))?
F.2 Tightness of the Characterization
Fix a mechanism A that is truthful for general valuations. Informally, Theorem 3.3 gives us that
cc(A) = poly(tax(A), price(A), tie(A), n,m). In this section we show that all terms are necessary
in the sense that omitting just one of tax(A), price(A), or tie(A) might imply a huge gap between
the LHS and the RHS.
All of our examples are based on (different) reductions from set disjointness. In this problem,
Alice receives a string A and Bob receives a string B, A,B ∈ {0, 1}t. The goal is to determine
whether there is some index k such that Ak = Bk = 1. A simple fooling set argument shows that
the deterministic communication complexity of f is exactly t (a similar bound holds for randomized
mechanisms, see, e.g., [36]). We note that it is straightforward to extend these examples and obtain
analogous results for mechanisms that use only value queries.
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F.2.1 Dropping tie(A)
We show that tie(A) is necessary to determine the communication complexity of a truthful mech-
anism A.
Proposition F.2 There is a truthful mechanism A with tax(A) = 1 (and thus price(A) = 0) and
cc(A) = exp(m,n).
Proof: Let f be the following two-player social choice function: player 1 is never allocated any
items. Player 2 with valuation v2 gets item a if v2({a}) > v2({b}) and item b if v2({b}) > v2({a}).
If v2({b}) = v2({a}) then player 2 gets either a or b according to some tie-breaking rule that will be
specified shortly. Player 1 is never allocated any items. Notice that f can obviously be implemented
truthfully and that its taxation complexity is 1 (the price for player 2 for items a and b is 0 and
the price of the rest of the bundles is ∞).
We now describe the tie-breaking rule. If there exists some player i and bundle S with vi(S) /∈
{0, 1} then player 2 is allocated item a. Else, player 2 is allocated item a if there exists some bundle
S, |S| = m/2, with v1(S) = v2(S). Player 2 is allocated item b otherwise.
We claim that the communication complexity of any mechanism that implements F is at least
exp(m). To prove this, we reduce from the set-disjointness problem. Let t =
(m
m
2
)
. Let the valuation
of Alice (player 1) be identically 0 for bundles S with |S| < m2 and identically 1 for bundles S with
|S| > m2 . For bundles S with |S| = m2 the value of S is determined by the value of AS , where we
assume some one-to-one and onto correspondence between the indices of A and bundles of size m2 .
Bob’s valuation (player 2) is defined similarly.
Notice that if one can implement f once can also solve set-disjointness. The communication
complexity of f is therefore
(m
m
2
)
= exp(m).
F.2.2 Dropping tax(A)
We give an example for a truthful mechanism A for two players and m items where price(A) and
tie(A) are small, yet cc(A) = exp(m).
Proposition F.3 There is a mechanism A with cc(A) = exp(m,n), tie(A) = m and price(A) = 1.
Proof: Let f be the following two-player social choice function: player 1 with valuation v1 is
never allocated any items. Player 2 with valuation v2 gets his maximum value bundle among all
bundles S of size m2 with v1(S) ≥ 1 and v2(S) ≥ 1. If there are several such bundles S, player 2
gets the lexicographically first one.
Notice that this social choice function can be implemented truthfully: the price of bundle S
is 1 if v1(S) ≥ 1, and it is ∞ otherwise. Given the menu, tie breaking is also easy: player 2
just announces his lexicographically first bundle among his set of profit-maximizing bundles. Also,
player 1 can announce the price of S simply by sending the bit “1” if v1(S) ≥ 1 and “0” otherwise.
We now show that the communication complexity of every truthful mechanism that implements
f is exp(m). We reduce again from the set disjointness problem. Let t =
(m
m
2
)
. Let the valuation
of Alice (player 1) be identically 0 for bundles S with |S| < m2 and identically 1 for bundles S with
|S| > m2 . For bundles S with |S| = m2 the value of S is determined by the value of AS , where we
assume some one-to-one and onto correspondence between the indices of A and bundles of size m2 .
Bob’s valuation (player 2) is defined similarly but with value 2 instead of 1 for non-zero bundles.
Notice that there is a bit k with Ak = Bk = 1 if and only if Bob has a bundle S with a positive
profit (= 1). The communication complexity of f is therefore
(m
m
2
)
= exp(m).
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F.2.3 Dropping price(A)
We give an example for a truthful mechanism A for three players and m items where tax(A)
and tie(A) are small, yet cc(A) = exp(m). Notice the necessity of using more than two players,
otherwise the price S in the menu that is presented to one player can be easily computed by the
other player, as the menu depends only on the valuation of the player that presents the menu.
Proposition F.4 There is a mechanism A with cc(A) = exp(m,n), tie(A) = 0 and tax(A) = 2.
Proof: Let f be the following three-player social choice function: players 1, 2 with valuation
v1, v2 never get any items. Player 3 with valuation v2 can only get the bundle that contains item
a alone or the empty bundle. The price of item a is determined according to the following rule, if
there exists some bundle S, |S| = m2 , with v1(S) = v2(S) = 1, then the price of item a is 1. Else,
the price of item a is 2.
Notice that f can obviously be implemented by a truthful mechanism. We also have that
tax(A) = 2. We now show that the communication complexity of every truthful mechanism that
implements f is exp(m). We again reduce from the set disjointness problem. Let t =
(
m
m
2
)
. Let
the valuation of Alice (player 1) be identically 0 for bundles S with |S| < m2 and identically 1 for
bundles S with |S| > m2 . For bundles S with |S| = m2 the value of S is determined by the value
of AS , where we assume some one-to-one and onto correspondence between the indices of A and
bundles of size m2 . Bob’s valuation (player 2) is defined similarly.
Notice that there is a bit k with Ak = Bk = 1 if and only if the price of item a is 1. The
communication complexity of f is therefore
(m
m
2
)
= exp(m).
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